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RECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL ORJ)ER:
THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING
THE JUVENILE COURT
JANET E. AiNSWORTH*
Although the institution of the juvenile court developed rather re-
cently in our legal system, it is now quite firmly established: every
American state and nearly every industrialized nation has a juvenile
court system in place The juvenile court is not without its critics, how-
ever. In this Article, Professor Janet Ainsworth recommends its com-
plete abolition. Professor Ainsworth contends that society's current view
of the nature of adolescence no longer comports with the turn-of-the-
century view that originally informed the development of an autono-
mous juvenile court, thus undermining the ideological legitimacy of a
separate court system forjuvenile& In addition, Professor Ainsworth ar-
gues that, because of the availability of procedural safeguards in the
adult court system and because of the greater opportunity for effective
assistance of counsel in the adult courts, juveniles will, in fact, benefit
from being tried within a unified criminal justice system.
Using social constructivist theory as the foundation for her Article,
Professor Ainsworth critically examines the changes in the social imagi-
nation of the nature of childhood and adolescence and proceeds to a re-
evaluation of one specific legal institution in light of that changed social
construct Professor Ainsworth's analysis, however, has much broader
implications for reshaping our legal system over time as society creates
and recreates its collective notion of reality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Juvenile courts exist in all fifty states of the United States and the District
of Columbia,' as well as in virtually all of the industrialized nations of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A. Brandeis Uni-
versity, 1975; M.A. Yale University, 1977; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1980. For their encourage-
ment and helpful comments and criticisms on this Article, my thanks go to Melinda Branscomb,
Eric Chiappinelli, Sid DeLong, Jane Ellis, Joan Fitzpatrick, Debbie Maranville, John Mitchell,
George Nock, Pierre Schlag, and David Skover.
1. ALA. CODE § 12-15 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-202 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-101 (1991); CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE § 245 (West 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-121 (West Supp. 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921 (1975 & Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2302 to 16-2303
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.022 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-3 (1990); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 571-11 (1985 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, para. 801-1 (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-1.1 (Burns Supp. 1990); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1604 (1986); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 610.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1564, 1568.1, 1621
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (1980 & Supp. 1989); MD. Cms. &
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world.2 So ubiquitous is the institution of the juvenile court in the contempo-
rary world that one easily might forget that it did not always exist. In fact, the
juvenile court is a relatively recent invention. 3
The juvenile court system has come under increasing attack in recent years
from both the right and left ends of the political spectrum. The right complains
that the system coddles young criminals and sets them loose to prey on society
after lenient sanctioning;4 the left decries the arbitrary railroading of predomi-
nantly lower class juveniles by paternalistic juvenile court judges.5 Ironically, as
this Article will explain, both criticisms are predicated on identical views about
the essential nature of childhood, views embodying a vastly different conception
of childhood from the one that gave birth to the juvenile court.
This Article examines the development of the juvenile court, revealing that
the system is premised on certain historically contingent beliefs and assumptions
about the unique nature of childhood. After presenting an historical account of
the socially constructed nature of childhood and adolescence, this study explores
how those constructs informed the ideology and practice of the juvenile court.
Next follows a discussion of how perceptions of youth have changed in the late
twentieth century, showing that these changes undermine the ideological legiti-
macy of a separate juvenile court system. As a result, juvenile court has under-
gone both ideological and institutional change from its original form. These
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (Supp. 1990); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.021 sub. 4 (West 1982);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-107 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.021(3) (Vernon 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-5-203 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-245(3) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62.036 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-B:2 to 169-B:4 (1990 & Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4A-24 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-4 (1989); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 302.1 (Mc-
Kinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-523 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-03 (1974); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.01.1(A)1 (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1101 to 1506
(West Supp. 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.472(3) (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6321 (Purdon
1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-5 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-400, 20-7-430 (Law. Co-op 1985 &
Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-1(5) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
102(14) (Supp. 1990); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-3 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 633 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 16,1-228 (Supp.
1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1 (1986 & Supp.
1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.03 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 14-6-202 (1986).
2. See, eg., J. CRAWFORD, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAW 205-08 (1982); THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 172 (H. Tanaka ed. 1976); WESTERN SYSTEMS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (M. Klein ed.
1984) (Canada, England, Wales, Israel, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden); Dahl, The Scandi-
navian System of Juvenile Justice: A Comparative Approach, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD
327 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Leon, The Development of Canadian Juvenile Justice: A Background
for Reform, 15 OSGOODE HALL L. 71, 81-104 (1977); McGee & Adamo, Juvenile Court Jurisdic-
tion in Italy and Europe, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 139 (1981); Power, Juvenile Justice in Great Britain:
Cautions, Hearings and Courts, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 299 (M. Rosenheim ed.
1976).
3. See infra notes 85-110 and accompanying text.
4. A succinct and forceful exposition of this position was given by Alfred Regnery, adminis-
trator of the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention under the Reagan Admin-
istration. See Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs an
Overhaul, 34 POL'Y REv. 65 (Fall 1985).
5. See generally A. PLAIT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 4 (2d
ed. 1977) (emphasizing use ofjuvenile court as instrument of social control over lower class youth);
Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposalfor a Return to the
Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 695-709 (1980) (condemning paucity of procedural
protections in juvenile court).
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shifts in theory and practice are outlined here, with specific attention given to
several United States Supreme Court decisions that significantly have affected
juvenile court. The Court's jurisprudence both reflects and shapes the current
social reality for juveniles in America.
Finally, this Article calls for the abolition of the juvenile court,6 suggesting
that such a course would better reflect current American beliefs about adoles-
cence. The Article will discuss the ideological costs of maintaining an institu-
tion that no longer comports with our cultural reality and the practical
consequences of abolishing the juvenile court. In considering these conse-
quences, this Article contends that the supposed benefits of juvenile jurisdiction
do not depend on the existence of a separate juvenile court, and that juveniles
would receive positive advantages from being tried within a unified criminal jus-
tice system.
On one level, this Article is an interpretive study of one institution, the
juvenile court, which begins with a thick description 7 of its historical and cul-
tural context and proceeds to a call for specific legal reform. On a more abstract
level, this study argues that consciousness of the nature of our interpretive con-
structs in general can have real-world consequences if we, as legal actors, choose
to reshape our legal world in light of that consciousness.
II. THE INVENTION OF CHILDHOOD
The choice of the word "invention" for this subheading is meant to be sub-
tly jarring. After all, it is human creations which ordinarily are said to be "in-
vented," whereas aspects of the natural world are said to be "discovered." By
calling childhood an invention, I am suggesting that childhood is better seen as a
social fact than as a biological one.
Before further exploring the nature of childhood, I first will lay out the
theoretical underpinnings for the remainder of this discussion. I premise this
Article explicitly on social constructivism, a social theory of knowledge; there-
fore, a precis of social constructivist theory and its influence on contemporary
thought will provide background for this study.
A. Constructivist Social Theory
Social constructivist theory8 originates from a radical epistemological skep-
6. In pressing for the abolition of the juvenile court in this Article, I am referring to juvenile
court adjudication of criminal charges, a function of every state juvenile court system now in place.
My analysis has obvious implications for juvenile court jurisdiction over so-called "status offenders"
such as truants and runaways, and for juvenile court jurisdiction over allegations of child abuse and
neglect. Addressing those other aspects of statejuvenile court systems, however, is beyond the scope
of this Article.
7. The term "thick description" was popularized by Clifford Geertz in his essay, Thick De-
scription: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CUL-
TURES 3 (1973). It refers less to a specific methodology than to a perspective that privileges multi-
layered, contextualized narrative over purportedly objective analysis.
8. As the following exposition of social constructivist theory shows, I am intellectually in-
debted to many of the scholars whose work I later discuss in this Article. The synthesis that follows,
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ticism, which holds that human knowledge cannot be grounded in either eternal
or universal truths, be they truths of human nature, of the physical world, or of
principles of logic or reason. Rejecting empiricism, with its reliance on experi-
ential verification of reality, constructivism denies that commonly accepted cate-
gories of knowledge can be validated through objective observation. It instead
posits that without pre-existing categorization, we could derive no meaning from
our observations of reality.
To the constructivist, categories within which we understand reality do not
correspond to that reality mapping, but rather are humanly created artifacts,
produced by culturally and historically situated participants in a collective social
enterprise. These socially created categories are propagated through social dis-
course, which is itself a culturally and historically situated practice. Thus, con-
structivism insists that all human knowledge, whether composed of
experientially gathered information or the shared categories that impose mean-
ing on that information, takes its form through social discourse.
These categories of knowledge are open-textured; in other words, they can
be extended to accommodate circumstances and information outside the original
parameters of the category. Consequently, these humanly fashioned interpretive
constructs allow for competing understandings and are susceptible to change
over time. Changes in these constructs, however, do not necessarily result from
changes in external reality. Whether our shared understandings prevail over
time depends not on the objectively verifiable validity of the construct but rather
on the cultural9 and social processes that generate the constructs in the first
place. Constructs may be abandoned or modified as the community comes to
question their coherence and perspicuity. Conversely, interpretive constructs
may be retained even in the face of what an outsider might see as contradiction
or illegitimacy.
To say that all knowledge is situated-that our experience of reality is both
culturally and historically contingent-is not to say that our constructs are inva-
lid or false. The social constructivist critique of foundationalist epistemology is
often misinterpreted as an attack on the value of certain categories of knowl-
edge, a mistaken conflation of the real with the natural. Constructivism does not
say that everyday visions of reality are false but rather that they are artificial,
and being humanly made, conceivably can be unmade and remade in a different
however, is my own perspective on this theory, and I make no attempt to tease out the origins of
each strand of the theory set out here, which informs this entire work.
9. Throughout this Article, I refer to "culture" and "cultural" construction as though culture
represents a reiaed entity. Of course, it is nothing of the kind. Cultures do not operate as coherent,
consistent unities, but as kaleidoscopic shifting fields on which the representation of meaning is
constantly undergoing contest and change. I make use of the idea of culture because it is a useful
construct, but like other constructs, it is deconstructible. Our representation of culture is no more a
transparent correspondence to some external social reality than our other social constructs are un-
mediated reflections of reality. For a further discussion of the problems inherent in a simple unitary
view of culture and its representation, see J. BOON, OTHER TRIBES, OTHER SCRIBES (1982); J. CLIF-
FORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988); K. DWYER, MOROCCAN DIALOGUES: ANTHRO-
POLOGY IN QUESTION (1982); G. MARCUS & M. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL
CRITIQUE (1986); WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (J. Clifford
& G. Marcus eds. 1986) [hereinafter WRITING CULTURE].
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way. For this reason, social constructivism provides the intellectual premises for
a social critique, as well as a mechanism to explain and promote social
transformation.
Across the spectrum of academic disciplines, a large and influential group
of scholars I° has based its scholarship on a constructivist view of social reality,
asserting that the constituent elements of a society-its institutions, customs,
practices, conceptual categories, values, and ideology-are socially constructed
artifacts. The modem germinal exposition of this theory is Peter Berger's and
Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality.1 1  Berger and
Luckmann acknowledge the intellectual antecedents of modem social construc-
tivism in such disparate sources as the relativistic historicism of Wilhelm
Dilthey, 12 the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz,1 3 and the self-
styled ontogenetic social psychology of George Herbert Mead. 14 Locating their
theoretical project within the field of the sociology of knowledge, 15 Berger and
Luckmann address the epistemologica1 I6 and sociological implications of con-
structivism. The key insight derived from looking at society as a composite of
humanly constructed artifacts is that even basic aspects of social life are neither
natural nor inevitable, as they may appear to members of that society, but rather
are culturally and historically contingent and mutable.1 7 The contingency and
mutability of social reality are largely invisible to those within the society.
Therefore, dramatic changes may occur in the created meaning of a social arti-
fact-be it a concrete artifact such as an institution or practice, or an abstract
artifact such as a value system or conceptual categoryl1 8-without members of
the society expressly desiring or even consciously registering those changes. In-
10. Categorizing these scholars by discipline is problematic, given the blurring of methodologi-
cal boundaries and the intellectual cross-fertilization in contemporary academia. See C. GEERTZ,
Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 19 (1983). According
to Geertz:
mT1he present jumbling of varieties of discourse has grown to the point where it is becoming
difficult either to label authors (What is Foucault-historian, philosopher, political theo-
rist? What [is] Thomas Kuhn - historian, philosopher, sociologist of knowledge?) or to
classify works (What is George Steiner's After Babel - linguistics, criticism, culture history?
What [is] William Gass's On Being Blue - treatise, causerie, apologetic?).
Id. at 20.
I nevertheless have taken a stab at identifying scholars by discipline both to indicate the breadth
of scholarly interest in constructivism as well as to locate specific contributions within a traditional
disciplinary framework. My categorization is, of course, somewhat arbitrary, as I was recently re-
minded in a conversation with a colleague when I referred to someone whom I identified as "James
Clifford, the anthropologist." My colleague looked blank for a second or two, until light dawned:
"Oh," he said, "You mean Clifford, the rhetorician."
11. P. BERGER & T. LUCKmANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCrIoN OF REALITY (1966).
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 16-17, 194-95.
14. Id. at 195-97.
15. Id. at 185-89.
16. Berger and Luckmann concede, however, that discussing epistemology within the context
of a work dedicated to the sociology of knowledge is akin to trying to push a bus on which one is
already riding. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 147-63.
18. Id. at 69 (describing a process they term "sedimentation" to account for changes in mean-
ing over time).
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stead, members of a society tend to impose their current belief structures onto
the past, attributing their version of social reality to those who came before
them. Eternally proceeding from one state of certainty about the nature of real-
ity to another different, incommensurate state of certainty, people are seldom if
ever aware of how completely their world is their own creation. 19
As Berger and Luckmann emphasize, the fact that reality is socially pro-
duced does not mean that the individual within society can, by an exercise of
will, escape the coercive force of reality.20 Rather, change in the social order
occurs through a dialectic process in which the constituent aspects of society
affect and are affected by the actions of the human beings who create them2 1 and
who are created as subjects by them.
22
Social constructivist theory has been enormously influential in the humani-
ties and in the social sciences, particularly in history,23 psychology,
24 sociol-
19. Kenneth Keniston has called this tendency "chronocentrism," coining the term by analogy
to ethnocentrism. Keniston observes that "every epoch tends to freeze its own unique experience
into life-in-general." Keniston, Psychological Development and Historical Change, 2 J. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY HISr. 329, 332 (1971).
20. P. BERGER & T. LucKmANN, supra note 11, at 60-62.
21. Id. at 116.
22. This tenet of constructivism, that the interplay of social practice and discourse is in fact
constituent of ourselves as human subjects, has been expanded upon at length in the work of Michel
Foucault. Foucault's notion of discourse is not primarily semiotic but, on the contrary, is an inter-
pretive model of "practices that systematically form the object of which they speak." M. Fou-
CAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 49 (1972).
23. Edward Said's Orientalim, E. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978), is a classic of constructivist
history. Said's central thesis is that European culture systematically created the idea of the Orient
and imposed this constructed reality for its own political ends. He explicitly warns the reader, how-
ever, that he neither "suggest[s] that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient" nor "make[s] an
assertion about the necessary privilege of an 'insider' perspective over an 'outsider' one." Id. at 322.
Rather, his truly constructivist move is to claim that all versions of "the Orient," including indige-
nous ones, are equally constructed; none are objective depictions of some supposed external reality.
Id. at 272-73, 322.
Not all constructivist history takes the form of Said's polemical social critique, however. An-
other variation on constructivist history is the rhetorical constructivism of intellectual historian
Hayden V. White. See generally H. WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1973) (using a taxonomy of narrative genres to classify modes of
representation of historical reality); H. WHITE, The Fictions of Factual Representation, in TROPICS
OF DISCOURSE 121 (1978) (historical writing, like fiction writing, uses tropological narrative modes
of emplotment and explanation). For constructivist historiography, see J. MEILAND, SCEPTICISM
AND HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE v-vi, 7-8, 187-99 (1965); Goldstein, History and the Primacy of
Knowing, BEIHEFT 16 HIsT. AND THEORY 29 (1977). See also Ankersmit, The Dilemma of Contem.
porary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History, BEIHEFr 25 HIST. AND THEORY 1 (1986) (providing an
excellent survey of constructivist philosophy of history).
24. See generally R. HARRE, PERSONAL BEING: A THEORY FOR INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 9-
30 (1984) (rejecting both Freudian psychodynamic and cognitive psychological models to explain the
perceived unity of the self and adopting a constructivist alternative). "Everything that appears to
each of us as the intimate structure of our personal being, I believe to have its source in a socially
sustained and collectively imposed cluster of theories." Id. at 21; see also P.D. ASHWORTH, SOCIAL
INTERACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS (1979) (grounding human consciousness in socially constructed
systems of meaning); J. COULTER, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUcTIoN OF MIND: STUDIES IN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY (1979) (psychology influenced by the linguis-
tic philosophy of Wittgenstein and the ethnomethodology of Garfinlde). For a constructivist per-
spective on psychoanalysis, see R. SCHAFER, THE ANALYTIC ATTrUDE 225 (1983) (calling
psychoanalysis a "second reality" but noting that so-called "ordinary reality" equally is a construc-
tion). Schafer correctly observes that the constructed nature of both of these realities makes them no
less useful to us. Id. at 225-26; see also J. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON
EMOTION (1982) (anger as social construct); J. BRUNER, IN SEARCH OF MIND: ESSAYS IN AUTOBI-
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ogy,25 and anthropology.26 Antifoundationalists such as philosophers Richard
Rorty2 7 and Nelson Goodman, 28 literary critic Stanley Fish,2 9 and political the-
orist Don Herzog30 share the fundamental constructivist perceptions about the
OGRAPHY (1983) (cognitive psychologist arguing that no "aboriginal" reality exists, rather we create
many realities from differing intentions); Averill, A Constructivist Theory of Emotion, in EMOTION:
THEORY, RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE (R. Plutnik & H. Kellermann eds. 1980) (explaining the
constructivist's view of emotion); T. SARBIN & J. MANCusO, SCHIZOPHRENIA: MEDICAL DIAGNO-
SIS OR MORAL VERDICT? (1980) (schizophrenia as culturally contingent categorization of
symptoms).
25. See D. BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (1976); S. FULLER, SOCIAL EPIsTE-
MOLOGY (1988); Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, 11 ANN. REV. OF
SOCIOLOGY 209 (1985). Sociologists studying the world of scientific research use constructivist in-
sights to explain how scientists develop the subjects of scientific inquiry and transmit scientific
knowledge among the research community. See M. ARBSa & M. HESSE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY (1986); H. COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICE (1985); E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 150-57 (1985); B. LATOUR
& S. WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979).
Current work in the sociology of science obviously is indebted to Thomas Kuhn's constructivist
philosophy of science. Kuhn posited that scientific inquiry proceeds on the basis of paradigms or
meta-theories about the nature of reality, which then generate specific scientific theories commensu-
rate with the paradigms. Paradigms organize and constrain scientific research, making some ques-
tions seem natural, leading to potentially fruitful avenues of research, and others irrelevant, dead-
end, perverse or even literally unthinkable. Kuhn termed science that was operating securely within
a paradigm "normal science." However, when scientific data or theories violate the paradigmatic
assumptions, the results first may be ignored, or treated as anomalous, or assumed to be the product
of flawed methodology. Eventually a growing body of anomalous information leads to confusion,
anomie and disillusionment within the scientific community, and persists unless and until a new
paradigm capable of incorporating the new data and theory supplants the old in the field. See T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUTIONs (2d ed. 1970).
26. Not surprisingly given its heritage of cultural relativism, contemporary cultural anthropol-
ogy has been a fertile field for constructivist theory and practice. In a series of dazzling essays,
Clifford Geertz has persuasively argued that ideology, law, art, and even common sense are socially
constructed and culturally contingent symbolic systems through which, in an endless social herme-
neutic circle, we create our world and in turn are created by it. C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION
OF CULTURES (1973); C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983); Geertz, Anti Anti-relativism, 86
AM. ANTHROPOLO. 263 (1984); see also Becker, Text-Building, Epistemology, and Aesthetics in Japa-
nese Shadow Theatre, in THE IMAGINATION OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COHER-
ENCE SYSTEMS 211 (A. Becker & A. Yengoyan eds. 1979) (an Indonesian case study of symbolic
systems as constituent of social reality).
Post-modernist anthropologists have carried this insight one step further, applying it reflexively
to their own work. See, eg., K. DWYER, supra note 9 (discussing how both social reality and ethno-
graphic accounts of that reality are constructs, giving a self-referential quality to contemporary an-
thropological fieldwork and implicitly leading to problems of intellectual infinite regress). For others
contributing to the reflexive turn to contemporary anthropological work, see J.CLIFFORD, supra note
9 (recognizing that anthropologists affect the subjects they study by the act of writing ethnography);
G. MARCUS & M. FISCHER, supra note 9 (same); WRITING CULTURE, supra note 9 (same).
27. See generally, R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 155-64, 315-94
(1979) (rejecting Cartesian foundationalism in favor of a pragmatic relativistic epistemology).
28. See N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 1-22, 109-29 (1978) (reality can only be ex-
perienced or described under one or more systems of interpretive constructs, which Goodman calls
"frames of reference").
29. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COM-
MuNrrIES 1-17, 338-55 (1980) (interpretive communities produce meaning, and so reality, through
shared values, assumptions, and ideology); Fish, Consequences, in AGAINST THEORY 107, 112
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1985) ("The norms and rules that foundationalist theory would oppose to his-
tory, convention, and local practice are in every instance a function or extension of history, conven-
tion, and local practice."). For a perceptive critique of Fish's concept of interpretive communities,
see Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 42-50 (1987).
30. D. HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY 224-43
(1985) (urging contextual justification over foundationalist justifications in grounding the moral and
political order).
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socially created nature of meaning and reality.
Given the impact of constructivist thought throughout the academy, it is
unsurprising that contemporary social science scholarship on the law has incor-
porated its insights.31 Social scientists see the role of law in society32 as, in the
words of Clifford Geertz, "constructive, constitutive and formational ....
[L]aw is local knowledge not placeless principle and... is constructive of social
life not reflective or anyway not just reflective of it .... -33
Constructivist theory has deeply influenced scholarship within legal
academia as well. More than fifty years ago, legal realists rejected the received
wisdom that law was determined by abstract legal principles or reasoning;
rather, they believed that law was created by judges influenced by external social
conditions. 34 Contemporary constructivist legal scholarship carries this insight
one step further, describing law as both constituent of social reality and as cre-
ated by it in a dialectic process, 35 a kind of constitutive hermeneutics. 36 This
constructivist view of the law has two corollary implications: first, that the ap-
parent intrinsicality and immutability of basic legal doctrine is illusory; 37 and
second, that understanding the process through which reality is constructed pro-
vides a mechanism for meaningful change in the law.
3 8
31. See infra notes 35, 37-38 and accompanying texts.
32. Two recent contributions to the project of assessing the role of law and legal process in
constituting society are Greenhouse, Interpreting American Litigiousness and Rosen, Islamic 'Case
Law'and The Logic of Consequence, both found in HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 252, 302 (V. Starr & J. Collier eds. 1985).
33. C. GEERTZ, Local Knowledge. Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE 218 (1983). Geertz refers to law as a symbol system for the "perception, understand-
ing, judgment, and manipulation of the world." Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in C.
GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 217 (1973) (undertaking a semiotic analysis of the
structures of signification in ideology).
34. Two of the most influential articles outlining the Legal Realist approach to jurisprudence
are Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935),
and Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). As com-
panion pieces, they form a useful introduction to the scholarly project undertaken by the Legal
Realists. For an analysis putting Legal Realism into its historical context, see E. PURCELL, THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94,
13946 (1973). For a capsule account of Legal Realism, see Gilmore, LegalRealism: Its Cause and
Cure, 70 YALE LJ. 1037, 1037-39 (1961).
35. See, eg., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 780 n.270 (1985) ("[Tlhis suggests the operation by which we make sense of
the world-using the available reservoirs of cultural meaning for purposes that both shape and are
shaped by the process in which we are engaged.").
36. I borrow the term from Steven Mailloux, who used it to describe constructivist epistemol-
ogy in literary theory. Mailloux, Truth or Consequences: On Being Against Theory, in AGAINST
THEORY 65, 68 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1985).
37. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 288-89 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982). Gordon refers to law as "manufactured necessity" in which "people ... build (legal)
structures, then act as if (and genuinely come to believe that) the structures they have built are
determined by history, human nature, and economic law." See also R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 18 (1986) (modem legal doctrine acts to mask the degree to which the
social order is constructed).
38. See Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 600-69 (1981) (interpretive legal constructs, such as the time frame of the legally significant
occurrence, underlie our perceptions of fact and our legal doctrinal deductions); Winter, Bull Dur-
ham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 677-93 (1990) (arguing against Stanley Fish's
assertion that anti-foundationalist theory has no practical consequences). Winter contends, correctly
I think, that self-conscious awareness of our own interpretive constructs is both possible and neces-
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B. The Social Construction of Childhood and Adolescence
It is one thing to recognize that aspects of society such as parliamentary
democracy, the exclusionary rule, and rugged individualism are socially contin-
gent artifacts, but perhaps harder to accept that the life-stage we call "child-
hood" is likewise a culturay 39 and historically4° situated social construction.
Of course, infants and young children are physiologically and psychologically41
different from older youths and adults; these differences undoubtedly persist
across time and place. As anthropologist Ruth Benedict once observed, how-
ever, "The facts of nature are 'doctored' in different ways by different cul-
tures." 42 Human biology may set the outside limits on our social definition of
ourselves, but, since biological constructs are themselves human artifacts,4 3 so-
cial riality constrains what we imagine to be biological necessity as well.44
Social definitions of reality determine which biological attributes will be
considered authentic, meaningful, and constituent of identity, and which will be
trivialized, ignored, suppressed, or even explicitly denied, 45 For example, the
biological differences between human males and females might seem to be an
obvious instance where immutable biology invariably overrides any of society's
attempts to deny or evade its constraints. No human society, one might think,
could define males as the producers of young in light of the inescapable biologi-
cal fact that males cannot give birth. Yet for many years, Weste:rn natural sci-
ence actually did credit males with creating the fetus without any contribution
from the female; scientists even "observed" tiny homunculi when they examined
sperm under primitive microscopes. 46 More generally, much research in psy-
sary, and that it enables us to imagine a different legal 6rder. Id.; see also Cover, The Supreme Court
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10 (1983) (discussing narrative
production of the codes that constitute both our normative universe and our social reality, thereby
constraining concepts of the possible in law).
39. For an exploration in a non-Western context of how a legal system could shape and be
shaped by concepts of childhood, see Bodde, Age. Youth, and Infirmity in the Law of Ch'ing China,
in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION 137 (1980) (childhood in late Imperial China seen by the
Chinese as similar to old age, justifying mitigation of punishment based on Confucian ideals of com-
passion for the weak, in contrast to Western notion that children should not be punished because
they lack the capacity to form the requisite mental state for criminal liability); Waltner, The Moral
Status of the Child in Late Imperial China: Childhood in Ritual and in Law, 53 Soc. REs. 667, 679-
84 (1986).
40. See infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
41. The psychological literature suggesting that age seven is the critical watershed dividing
infants and young children from older children and adults in their cognitive and psychological char-
acteristics is surveyed in Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 503, 543 (1984).
42. Benedict, Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning, I PSYCHIATRY 161
(1938), quoted in Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social
Context, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 38, 43 (Summer 1975).
43. See the discussion of the social construction of scientific knowledge, supra note 25.
44. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 11, at 180 (referring to the "dialectic between
the individual's biological substratum and his socially produced identity").
45. Id. at 180-83.
46. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such eminent natural scientists as
Leeuwenhoek, Andry, Gautier, Dalenpatius and Hartsoeker all claimed to have observed miniature,
perfectly formed humans curled up in the heads of spermatozoa. J. NEEDHAM, A HISTORY OF
EMBRYOLOGY 205-06 (1959). Joseph Needham called this preformational theory of embryonic ori-
gin "one of the most striking victories of the imagination over the understanding," Id. at 238.
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chology,47 sociology, 48 and anthropology,49 as well as feminist theory,50 con-
firms the socially constructed nature of gender identity and much of what are
often assumed to be natural gender characteristics.
Similarly, the socially constructed aspects of human life-stages such as
childhood and adolescence far outweigh their invariant biological attributes.
The number of stages into which an individual's life is divided and the essential
qualities deemed characteristic of each stage in the life-cycle have varied over
time"1 and across cultures.52 Indeed, the very concept that human lives pass
through life-stages with distinct characteristics has not always held the social
and legal significance that it does in the contemporary West.
5 3
Those of us inhabiting a post-Kuhnian world might call it an archetypical instance of normal sci-
ence, in which theory tends to determine data rather than the other way around.
47. Several branches of contemporary psychology have contributed to this insight. A psycho-
analytic approach to the development of gender characteristics in early childhood is taken by Nancy
Chodorow. See N. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989); N.
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978). For a collection of essays grounded in
social psychology exploring this subject, see MAKING A DIFFERENCE: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF GENDER (R. Hare-Mustin & J. Marecek eds. 1990). A psycholinguistic approach
appears in Bern, Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex Typing, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REV. 354 (1981).
48. See C. FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL OR-
DER (1988); J. MONEY & P. TUCKER, SEXUAL SIGNATURES: ON BEING A MAN OR A WOMAN
(1975).
49. See H. MOORE, FEMINISM AND ANTHROPOLOGY 12-41 (1988); SEXUAL MEANINGS: THE
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY (S. Ortner & H. Whitehead eds. 1981);
Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?, in WOMAN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 67 (1974).
50. The literature here is far too extensive to canvass adequately. Any listing would have to
begin with de Beauvoir. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1949). Subsequent French feminist
thought has continued to wrestle with the issue of the degree to which the nature of woman is
socially imposed. See, eg., Kristeva, Woman Can Never Be Defined, in THE NEw FRENCH FEMI-
NISMS 137 (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1980) (discussing contingency of the definition of
"woman" using the example of China, where author saw a different distribution of sexual attributes
than in the West); see also Variations on Common Themes, in THE NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS, supra,
at 212, 230 ("Woman" as defined exists only as an instrument of exploitative social hierarchy.).
A representative perspective on this topic in current American feminist jurisprudence is Olsen,
Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1166 (1939) (maintaining that the attrib-
utes typically ascribed to women are socially contingent). But see West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (contending that women's corporeal experience of menstruation,
childbirth and breast-feeding gives rise to a specifically female sense of interpersonal connection that
contrasts to the masculine alienated autonomous self); cf C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982) (arguing that women's moral reasoning differs from that of men, although Gilligan does not
expressly adopt either a cognitive essentialist or social constructivist origin of the difference).
51. See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
52. Anthropological evidence suggests that adolescence, for example, is by no means univer-
sally recognized. Some cultures recognize a gradual transition from childhood into adult activities
and responsibilities; others observe puberty as the event marking the passage from childhood to
adulthood without any intermediate transitional phase corresponding to adolescence in the modem
West. Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 61-63 (Summer 1975). The breadth of cultural variability in defining the
meaning of childhood is demonstrated in the essays collected in CHILDHOOD IN CONTEMPORARY
CULTURES (M. Mead & M. Wolfenstein eds. 1955) (discussing topics such as child-rearing literature
and children's imaginative productions); cf THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF AGING (Q. Sokolovsky ed.
1990) (exploring cultural variability in defining the attributes and significance of old age).
53. For example, though the Latin language had vocabulary to name the stages of a person's
life, these categories were vague abstractions, in no sense central to the ancient Roman's sense of
self-identity. P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 20-32
(1962) (discussing stages of life in other civilizations and cultures). Our culture appears singular in
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The definition of childhood-who is classified as a child, and what emo-
tional, intellectual, and moral properties children are assumed to possess-has
changed over time in response to changes in other facets of society.5 4 Historian
Philippe Axie first pointed out the dramatic contrast between the modem West-
em conception of childhood and the conception held in the medieval European
world.55 As he observed, "In medieval society, the idea of childhood did not
exist.... [The] awareness of the particular nature of childhood .. .which
distinguishes the child from the adult ... was lacking."'5 6 At that time, the
primary age-based boundary was drawn between infancy, a time of physical de-
pendence ending roughly at age seven, and full personhood.5 7 Those persons
older than seven, especially those in the lower social classes,58 participated in the
normal range of adult activities: they were apprenticed to begin their working
lives,59 drank in tavems,6° shared the same games and amusements as adults,6 1
gambled, 62 and were exposed to sexual behavior and jokes. 63 Wearing the same
kind of clothing, these young people even looked like adults. Not surprisingly,
then, medieval art depicted them as miniature adults.64 In short, within the
medieval world, the young were fully integrated members of the community.
No one believed that young people were innocent beings who needed to be quar-
antined from a harsh adult world.
6 5
In later centuries, the period between the end of infancy and sexual matur-
ity was redefined as a discrete stage in human development. Two seemingly
contradictory strands of Western thought gave rise to this refiguration of child-
hood. On the one hand, the Calvinist doctrine of infant depravity characterized
the young as inherently sinful and doomed to spiritual death absent coercive
its "sharp discontinuities" and dichotomies between childhood and adulthood. Skolnick, supra note
52, at 65.
54. P. BERGER & T. LucKMANN, supra note 11, at 136-37; H. MooRE, supra note 49, at 204
n.18; J. SOLOMON, THE SIGNS OF OUR TIME 45-48 (1988).
55. P. ARis, supra note 53. Aries's ground-breaking historical study has been followed by
subsequent scholarship, confirming his central thesis on the temporal variability of the treatment of
children flowing from the changing social definition of children. See, e.g., J. DEMOS, A LrriLE
COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY xiii (1970) (children and family life in
colonial America); J. GILLIS, YOUTH AND HISTORY (1974) (European history of children from the
eighteenth century on); D. HUNT, PARENTS AND CHILDREN IN HISTORY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
FAMILY LIFE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE (1970) (status of the child during the French ancien
regime). But see L. POLLOCK, FORGOTrEN CHILDREN: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS FROM 1500-
1900 (1983) (arguing that a distinct stage of childhood was observed somewhat earlier than Aries
claimed, but generally agreeing with Aries that the idea of childhood is historically contingent).
56. P. AIs, supra note 53, at 128.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Id.
59. J. GILLIS, supra note 55, at 7-8; see also P. ARIES, supra note 53, at 366-68 (discussing the
apprenticeship system).
60. P. ARIEs, supra note 53, at 368.
61. Id. at 62-71.
62. Id. at 71, 81-84.
63. Id. at 100-03.
64. Id. at 33-35.
65. Id. at 106.
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discipline by adults.6 6 In contrast, Enlightenment philosophy and the later ro-
manticism of Rousseau saw children as innately innocent beings whose potential
should be nurtured by parents without corrupting their natural goodness.
6 7
What both of these conceptions of childhood shared, however, in contrast to the
earlier medieval construction, was the belief that children are essentially differ-
ent from adults and that one aspect of that difference is their intrinsic
malleability.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw an extension of this
dramatic reconstruction of childhood.6 8 In the academy, experts dedicating
their scholarship to the study of the child placed great emphasis on how inher-
ently and essentially different children are from adults. The so-called "child-
study" movement was predicated on the belief that childhood is composed of
stages, each with characteristic emotions, capacities and needs. Appropriating
from the theory of evolution the slogan "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,"
69
proponents of child study now had a model justifying scholarly focus on child-
hood. Because they believed that the chronological development of the individ-
ual human echoes the historical development of human civilization, 70 studying
childhood was thought to provide a window on the otherwise unknowable
human past. By the same token, child study proponents reasoned, what society
knew of the past would teach it how best to socialize the young.
As this "child-study" movement gained momentum, prominent universities
such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton rushed to set up departments of child de-
velopment. 7 1 In medicine, the perception of the uniqueness of childhood led to
66. Skolnick, Children's Rights ChildrenIs Development, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE 138, 150 (L. Empey ed. 1979).
67. Id.; L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY: ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION 50 (1978).
The impact of this concept on juvenile court ideology is noted in E. RYERSON, THE BEST LAID
PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 28-30 (1978).
68. Without attempting full discussion of the changes in American society at the turn of the
century that led to the reconstruction of childhood and the invention of adolescence, the following
brief sketch is intended to provide a sense of historical context for the refiguration of childhood.
Due to population growth in urban areas and the increasing industrialization of the American
economy during this period, the United States underwent a metamorphosis from a predominantly
rural agrarian society into an urban industrial one. Industrialization physically displaced work from
workers' homes, making child labor logistically more impractical. Simultaneously, child labor be-
came less attractive to industrial employers, who had fewer and fewer jobs suitable for children, who
were less skilled and physically weaker than adult workers. Additionally, the surge of immigrants
from Southern and Eastern Europe, considered more culturally resistant to assimilation than earlier
waves of immigrants, made longer education seem an attractive vehicle for their socialization. All of
these factors made it possible, even desirable, to postpone the entry of teenagers into the adult work
force. See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-07 (1980); Demos & Demos, Adolescence in Historical Per-
spective, 31 J. MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 632, 636-37 (1969); Empey, Introduction, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 17-20 (L. Empey ed. 1979).
69. In embryology, the phrase "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" refers to the concept that
fetal development replicates what evolutionary theory teaches are the developmental stages of spe-
cies evolution. B. BALINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMBRYOLOGY 8 (4th ed. 1975). As used by
the turn of the century "child study" movement, the phrase assumed a teleological view of historical
progress, with human society inevitably passing from primitive to advanced stages -as surely as babies
grow into adults.
70. S. TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 21 (1982); Skolnick, supra note 52, at 49, 58-59.
71. S. TIFFIN, supra note 70, at 22.
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the birth of pediatrics and the founding of specialized children's hospitals.7 2 On
the political front, Congress, in 1912, passed a federal bill to establish a special
Children's Bureau within the Cabinet Department of Commerce and Labor.
7 3
At the same time that academic and governmental attention was focusing
on childhood, the temporal contours of childhood were extended through the
creation of a new stage of pre-adulthood-adolescence.7 4 Although the word
"adolescence" was not actually invented during this period,75 the term rarely
was used prior to the late nineteenth century, and little or no attention paid to
any special characteristics that teenagers might have.76 By the turn of the cen-
tury, the attributes of childhood7 7 were being applied to teenagers, who only a
generation earlier would not have been distinguished from older adults. Since as
children they were assumed to be vulnerable, malleable, and in need of adult
guidance, training, and control before they could graduate to full personhood,
adolescents now became targets of paternal adult attention. Compulsory school
attendance laws, which earlier had been ignored in those few jurisdictions that
enacted them, were passed in state legislatures and were increasingly enforced.
78
Between 1900 and 1930, the number of high school graduates increased 600
percent.79 At the same time, legislatures promulgated child labor laws establish-
ing a minimum age for workers, limiting the hours that could be worked, and
regulating the conditions of employment.80 As a result, the number of people
72. H. CHUDACOFF, How OLD ARE You? AGE CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 44-
45 (1989).
73. S. TIFFIN, supra note 70, at 236; see Children's Bureau Act, Pub. L. No. 116, ch. 73, 37
Stat. 79 (1912).
74. The emergence of adolescence as an accepted social "fact" in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century has been well-documented. See, eg., J. DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL:
THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13 (1986); J. KErr, RITES OF PAS-
SAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA-1790 TO THE PRESENT 111-264 (1977); Bakan, Adolescence in
America: From Idea to Social Fact, 100 DAEDALUS 979, 979-84 (1971); Lapsley, Enright & Serlin,
Toward a Theoretical Perspective on the Legislation of Adolescence, 5 J. OF EARLY ADOLESCENCE
441, 443-44 (1985); Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the Legal Conception of
Growing Up and Letting Go, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 78-88 (Summer 1975); Skolnick, supra note
52, at 61-63.
75. Although the existence of the word antedates this period, it was little used before the turn
of the century. Demos & Demos, supra note 68, at 632. The term was popularized by G. Stanley
Hall in his influential, and dauntingly titled, two-volume work: G. HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSY-
CHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELI-
GION AND EDUCATION (1904). For an assessment of Hall's far-reaching influence on the scholarship
and public policy of the period on adolescence, see D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 207-11; S.
TIFFIN, supra note 70, at 20-23; Skolnick, supra note 52, at 58-59, 62. For a general biography of
Hall, see D. Ross, G. STANLEY HALL: THE PSYCHOLOGIST AS PROPHET (1972).
76. To illustrate, popular literature on child-rearing of the nineteenth century displayed little
concern for the attributes or problems of the post-pubescent. By the turn of the century, however,
this literature was filled with helpful advice for parents of teenagers. Demos & Demos, supra note
68, at 632.
77. Adult and child were seen as binary opposites, with dichotomous natures: "Adults work
and are responsible, children play and are irresponsible; adults are controlled and rational, children
are emotional and irrational; adults think abstractly, children think concretely; adults are sexual,
children asexual; and so on." A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING MAR-
RIAGE AND THE FAMILY 339 (4th ed. 1987).
78, Lapsley, Enright & Serlin, supra note 74, at 444-45.
79. Id. at 450.
80. H. CHUDACOFF, supra note 72, at 87-91; S. TIFFIN, supra note 70, at 145-46.
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between the ages of ten and fifteen who were gainfully employed declined sev-
enty-five percent from 1910 to 1930.81 The minimum age for marriage was
raised to discourage early marrying.8 2 The consequences of this spate of law
reform prolonged the economic dependence of adolescents, increased the
amount of age stratification in society,8 3 and established a greater degree of for-
mal social control over the young than had existed previously.
8 4
III. THE INVENTION OF ADOLESCENCE AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF JUVENILE COURT
Among all of the law reforms adopted during the Progressive Era to accom-
modate the new perception of the adolescent's nature and needs, the creation of
the juvenile court undoubtedly ranks as the most far-reaching achievement.8 5
The rapidity 86 with which the concept spread is striking. In 1899, Illinois
passed the Juvenile Court Act, founding a juvenile system widely acknowledged
at the time as the model for other states to follow. 87 And follow they did; within
twenty years all but three states had similar juvenile justice systems in place. 88
81. Lapsley, Enright & Serlin, supra note 74, at 450.
82. H. CHUDACOFF, supra note 72, at 86.
83. One obvious instance of this age stratification occurred in education. Age-grading in the
classroom was based on the assumption that a child's abilities, needs and interests were most com-
patible with those of children of a similar age, and that age segregation in a child's daily life was both
natural and beneficial. Before the turn of the century, the practice was almost unknown. H.
CHUDACOFF, supra note 72, at 30-40; L. EMPEY, supra note 67, at 65-67; Bittner, Policing Juveniles:
The Social Context of Common Practice, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 70-71 (M. Rosen-
heim ed. 1976). David Rothman contends that increased age stratification operated as a vehicle for
social control of youths. Rothman, Documents in Search of a Historian: Toward a History of Child-
hood and Youth in America, 2 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HisT. 367, 377 (1971).
84. Lapsley, Enright & Serlin, supra note 74, at 443-44; Empey, Introduction, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 18-20 (L. Empey ed. 1979).
85. The juvenile court has been described as "one of the... innovations in an era renowned for
its solicitous attention to children." S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT 66
(1977). For a more detailed description of the historical development of the juvenile court, see A.
PLATT, supra note 5, at 3-152; E. RYERSON, supra note 67, at 16-56; S. SCHLOSSMAN, supra at 55-
156; Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform.. An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1221-30
(1970); Rendleman, Parens Patriae" From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205, 207-
55 (1971).
86. As the speed of its adoption would indicate, the juvenile court was not a complete break
with then-existing practices. Its antecedents can be seen in the 'houses of refuge' of the earlier
nineteenth century, and in the penological reform movement that sponsored the reformatory as the
model for corrections. See A. PLATT, supra note 5, at 46-55, 101-36; Fox, supra note 85, at 1187-
1230. For a detailed account of the houses of refuge, see R. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS
OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-1857 (1969). Juvenile institutions are discussed
in comparison with other incarcerating institutions of the period in D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY
OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 206-16 (1971) (institu-
tions in early and mid-nineteenth century) and in D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 205-18 (asylums
in Progressive Era). The penitentiary correctional movement is examined in M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST
MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1978), and in T.
DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES (1987),
a study heavily influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. Cf. M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH (1979) (the penitentiary model of corrections as an exemplar of the transformation of social
power from an order marked by relationships of sovereignty to one marked by relationships of
discipline).
87. A. PLATT, supra note 5, at 9-10.
88. Id.; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 215; E. RYERSON, supra note 67, at 81.
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The desirability, even necessity, for a separate court system to address the
problems of young people appeared obvious, given the newly emerging view of
the adolescent as an immature creature in need of adult control. When parental
control failed, the benevolent, if coercive, hand of the state could provide the
corrective molding needed by the errant youth.8 9 By categorizing the adolescent
as a sub-class of the child rather than as a type of adult, the Progressives fash-
ioned a discrete juvenile justice system premised upon the belief that, like other
children, adolescents are not morally accountable for their behavior. Thus, ordi-
nary retributive punishment for the adolescent would be inappropriate. The
Progressives treated lawbreaking by juveniles as a symptom justifying, in fact
humanely requiring, state intervention to save them from a life of crime that
might otherwise be their fate.
The allusion to medical treatment suggested by the word "symptom" is not
accidental; the Progressives frequently compared social deviance to physical dis-
ease.90 Although Progressive ideology entertained an eclectic set of conflicting
notions about the causes of deviant behavior, including physiological, genetic,
and environmental theories, the belief that criminal behavior was caused by un-
wholesome environment, especially the baneful influence of squalid urban life,
came to dominate correctional thinking.9 1 Juvenile misbehavior was seen as
merely the overt manifestation of underlying social pathology. Like physical
pathology, social pathology could not be ignored or the "disease" might progres-
sively worsen. With proper diagnosis and treatment, however, social pathology
was considered as susceptible to cure as physical ailments. Particularly in light
of the supposedly malleable nature of juveniles, the Progressives exuded confi-
dence in their ability to cure juvenile delinquency.
92
The juvenile court movement gained momentum from the proselytizing ef-
forts of some of its early judges.93 In stump speeches to civic groups, in editori-
89. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 207.
90. For instance, one turn of the century commentator wrote: "The time will come ... when
moral defects will be treated... as pathological cases, symptomatically, and not as punishable
crimes." Grossman, Criminality in Children, 22 THE ARENA 645 (1899), quoted in E. RYERSON,
THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 24 (1978). Boston Juvenile
Court Judge Baker carried the analogy even further. In a 1910 article promoting the juvenile court
system, Judge Baker compared the judge to a "physician" engaged in a proper diagnosis of the case,
of the "outbreak" of criminal behavior. Once treatment had begun, the judge must check up on the
progress of the probationer "just as a physician might doin the case of a bum or a bruise." Even
tighter supervision would be needed to cure more intransigent cases of deviance, which Judge Baker
likened to "tuberculosis or typhoid." Baker, PROCEDURE FOR THE BOSTON JUVENILE COURT,
quoted in L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY: ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION 499-50
(1978). For a general discussion of the hold that the "medical model" of criminal behavior had on
criminology of the period, see T. DUMM, supra note 86, at 89-96.
91. A. PLATr, supra note 5, at 18-55; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 210-12.
92. E. RYERSON, supra note 67, at 120.
93. Among the most influential advocates of the juvenile court were the architects of the model
system in Illinois, including Timothy Hurley, the chief administrator of the system; Richard Tuthill,
an Illinois juvenile court judge; and Julian Mack, the Cook County juvenile court judge whose 1909
Harvard Law Review article, Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909), was so
influential that it is among the most-cited law review articles of all time. THE MOT-CiTED LAW
REVIEW ARTICLES iii (F. Shapiro ed. 1987) (fifth most frequently cited article written prior to
1947). For more details on the early promoters of the juvenile court, see D. ROTHMAN, supra note
68, at 210-18.
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als in the popular press, and in articles in professional journals, these advocates
of the new juvenile court system tirelessly promoted the redemptive message
embodied in juvenile court ideology. One such advocate, Judge Julian Mack,
attributed the necessity for a separate juvenile court system to its exclusive con-
cern for the social rehabilitation of needy youths. In contrast, criminal courts
focused on the judgment of whether the accused had violated the law and if so,
what penalty was warranted. He wrote, "The problem for determination by the
judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he,
how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career."'94 To the advo-
cates of the juvenile court, the essential difference between the moral and cogni-
tive capacities of the juvenile and those of the adult did not serve merely to
mitigate juvenile culpability for breaking the law, but to absolve the juvenile
completely from criminal liability.
95
Juvenile court philosophy made no distinction between criminal and non-
criminal behavior, as long as the behavior was considered deviant or inappropri-
ate to the age of the juvenile. Behavior such as smoking, sexual activity, stub-
bornness, running away from home, swearing, and truancy could trigger juvenile
court jurisdiction as validly as could breaking a criminal law.9 6 Because the
child was not being punished, but rather protected by the state, juvenile court
had a mandate to assume liberal jurisdiction over the wayward young, much as
it might over other helpless and needy members of society. 97 The idea that the
peculiar vulnerability of children justified state control over them was analo-
gized to the well-established chancery court principle, parenspatriae, which gave
the state authority over parentless children.98 Invoking a chancery court pedi-
gree for juvenile court jurisdiction, the parens patrfie doctrine lent legitimacy to
the new court system while it obscured the extent to which juvenile court
marked an unprecedented expansion of state social control over adolescents.
Every aspect of theparenspatriae juvenile court was designed to mold way-
94. Mack, supra note 93, at 119-20.
95. In the words of one participant in the 1902 National Conference on Charities and Correc-
tion, "It is hard that children should be brought into court for 'committing a crime.' A child cannot
commit a crime: they are in the same class as the insane in this respect." E. RYERSON, supra note
67, at 75.
96. See Schlossman & Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delin-
quency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. EDUc. REv. 65, 70, 81 (1978); see also Mack, supra note 93,
at 107 (lumping together "the child who has begun to go wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken
a law or an ordinance").
97. See, e.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954). According to the court, the
juvenile court's "purpose is not penal but protective .... The State is not seeking to punish an
offender but to salvage a boy who may be in danger of becoming one." Id. at 603, 109 A.2d at 525.
The court equated the system's response to delinquent juveniles with that given the "neglected,
destitute or physically handicapped." Id.
98. See generally Rendleman, supra note 85, at 211-23 (history of the application of the parens
patriae doctrine in the United States, noting the hostility with which chancery jurisdiction was re-
ceived in early America); E. RYERSON, supra note 67, at 63-72 (same). But see A. PLATr, supra note
5, at 159 (arguing that juvenile court doctrine was nothing like equity jurisdiction, and that the




ward youths into good citizens.99 The hallmark of the system was its disposi-
tion, individually tailored to address the needs and abilities of the juvenile in
question. 1° ° To that end, judges were given almost limitless discretion 1° 1 in
crafting the disposition to facilitate whatever the judge thought would "cure"
the youth. Juveniles could be put on probation until their majority, giving the
juvenile court total control over every aspect of the probationer's life.' 0 2 If the
juvenile was incarcerated in a juvenile detention facility, the commitment would
be for an indeterminate period,10 3 because the judge could not perfectly predict
99. Anthony Platt observed that the system taught "lower class skills and middle class values"
to its juvenile charges. A. PLATr, supra note 5, at 69.
100. Some states premised their juvenile court systems on the court's duty to act in the best
interests of the child. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-35(a) (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-15.5
(Bums 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-37 (West, repealed 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-31
(Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 657 (1981). In an analogous formulation, some states statu-
torily charged the juvenile court with providing care and custody for the juvenile equivalent to that
which the parent should have provided. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-2 (Smith-Hurd
1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4 to 31-6-12 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.1 (West 1985);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2501 (repealed 1977); NEv. REv. STAT. § 62.031 (1985); NJ. STAT.
ANN § 2A:4-2 (West, repealed 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-
160 (Law. Co-op, repealed 1981). Similar statutory expressions of purpose include ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 45-402 (repealed 1989) ("as far as practicable, the juvenile shall be treated not as a criminal,
but as misdirected, misguided, and in need of aid, encouragement, assistance, and counseling");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-605 (1972 & Supp. 1989) ("No proceeding... shall be a criminal pro-
ceeding but shall be entirely of a civil nature concerned with the care, protection and rehabilitation
of the child in question."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516(3) (1989) ("EtlO develop a disposition in each
juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the child, the
strengths and weaknesses of the family, and the protection of the public safety"); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6301(2) (Purdon 1982) (mandating its court "to remove ... the consequences of
criminal behavior and substitute ... supervision, care, and rehabilitation").
101. Among statutes that had given juvenile judges wide sentencing latitude were: ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-241(2) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-140 (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2320 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(2) (West, repealed 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-33,
35 (Harrison 1990); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-48(l)(A-C) (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-
1 (Smith-Hurd, repealed 1982); IND. CODE § 9-3215 (date); IOWA CODE § 232.52(2) (1985 & Supp.
1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill, repealed 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2611 (repealed 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-605 (1972 & Supp. 1989); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 62.211 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:19 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-37
(West, repealed 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-647 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (An-
derson 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.507 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6352 (Purdon 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-32 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-620 (Law. Co-op, repealed 1981); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 655, 657 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1.279 (1990).
102. The early advocates of the juvenile court considered probation essential to its functioning.
Illinois juvenile court administrator Timothy Hurley considered probation "the keystone which sup-
ports the arch of this law;" Illinois Judge Richard Tuthill echoed the sentiment, calling probation
"the cord upon which all of the pearls of the juvenile court are strung ... Without it, the juvenile
court could not exist." D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 218.
103. The following state statutes are among those that originally provided for indeterminate
juvenile sentencing: ALA. CODE § 12-15-71(c)(3)(a), 12-15-74 (1986 & Supp. 1990); ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-28-209 (1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607
(West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-141 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2322 (1990);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(4) (West 1988); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-48(3) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, paras. 802-23(3), 803-24(3), 804-21(3) & 805-23(3) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-6-4-15.5, 31-6-4-19(g)-(i) (Bums 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.53 (West 1985); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.240, 208.430 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972, repealed 1984); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1580 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2714 (1980 &
Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-605(g)(iii) (1972 & Supp. 1990); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ Code § 12-15-71(c)(3)(a), 12-15-74 (1986 & Supp. 1990); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1989);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-28-209 (1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607 (West 1984); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-141 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2322 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.11(4) (West 1988); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-48(3) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, paras.
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in advance the amenability of the youth to rehabilitative treatment. Once reha-
bilitated, the youth would be released from further court control, regardless of
the seriousness of the offense that gave rise to juvenile court jurisdiction, because
the court's basis for its disposition was treatment, not punitive sanction. Indeed,
the juvenile court judge could, at least in theory, discharge the juvenile offender
immediately after the dispositional hearing if the judge believed that the youth
had no need for court-monitored treatment or services, even if the juvenile had
committed a serious offense.! ° 4
Some states deliberately eliminated the usual procedural formalities of
criminal adjudication from juvenile court.10 5 These formalities were considered
both unnecessary and undesirable: unnecessary because the role of the court
was not to adjudicate guilt and punish, but to prescribe treatment;10 6 undesir-
able because informality itself was deemed a part of the rehabilitative process.
107
802-23(3), 803-24(3), 804-21(3) & 805-23(3) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-4-15.5,
31-64-19(g)-(i) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.53 (West 1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 208.240, 208.430 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972, repealed 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1580
(West 1990 & Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2714 (1980 & Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-21-605(g)(iii) (1972 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ Code § 12-15-
71(c)(3)(a), 12-15-74 (1986 & Supp. 1990); AR1z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1989); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 9-28-209 (1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-141 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2322 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(4) (West
1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-48(3) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 802-23(3), 803-
24(3), 804-21(3) & 805-23(3) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-4-15.5, 31-6-4-19(g)-(i)
(Bums 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.53 (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.240, 208.430
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972, repealed 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1580 (West 1990 & Supp.
1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2714 (1980 & Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-
605(g)(ii) (1972 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ Code § 12-15-71(c)(3)(a), 12-15-74
(1986 & Supp. 1990); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-28-209 (1987);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-141 (West 1986);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2322 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(4) (West 1988); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 571-48(3) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 802-23(3), 803-24(3), 804-21(3) & 805-
23(3) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-4-15.5, 31-6-4-19(g)-(i) (Burns 1986); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.53 (West 1985); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.240, 208.430 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1972, repealed 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1580 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2714 (1980 & Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-605(g)(iii) (1972 &
Supp. 1990); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 62.082, 62.211 (Michie 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-B:19(1)j) (1986 & Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-37 (West 1984); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.355(A)(4),(5),(6) (Anderson 1983 & Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.511(1) (1989);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6353 (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3a-39, 78-
3a-40 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 657 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285 (1988).
104. See supra note 101 for statutes giving juvenile court judges almost total discretion in
sentencing.
105. Some state statutes guaranteed the juvenile an informal proceeding. See, eg., HAW. REv.
STAT. § 571-41(a) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-1807A (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.29
(West 1985); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 208.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (repealed 1984); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.1579 (West 1977, repealed 1978); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-405 (Supp.
1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.193 (Michie 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24 (Supp. 1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Anderson 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.498 (1989); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336(a) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33 (1987).
106. Minnesota juvenile court judge Grier Orr acknowledged that procedural rules such as the
rules of evidence "are sometimes forgotten or overlooked, because the juvenile court was a court of
inquiry and not of prosecution; it is to find out the good that is within the boy or the child and to
point out the way to reform, not to punish." D. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 216. Since procedural
rules are designed to protect the accused from overreaching by the state, the protective aims of the
court rendered them unnecessary. E. RYERSON, supra note 67, at 38-39; D. ROTHMAN, supra note
68, at 216-17.
107. Procedural informality extended even to the recommended physical layout of the court-
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For this reason, trial by jury was eliminated in most juvenile courts as irrelevant
to the proper determination before the court, because the court was less con-
cerned with factually determining whether the child had broken the law than
with sensitively diagnosing and treating the child's social pathology. As the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed, "Whether the child deserves to be saved
by the state is no more a question for a jury than whether the father, if able to
save it, ought to save it."'10 8
The object of what Judge Mack termed "not so much the power, as the
friendly interest of the state"'1 9 was invariably referred to as "the child," the
"boy or girl" or "the lad."110 Calling teenaged lawbreakers "children" was not
disingenuous rhetoric. Rather, it demonstrates that the social construction of
adolescence as a species of childhood powerfully informed the ideology and
practice of the parens patriae juvenile court.
IV. THE REFIGURATION OF THE LiFE CYCLE IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
From our vantage point in the late twentieth century, the Progressives' use
of the word "child" to describe the adolescent youth accused of violating the law
seems incongruous if not willfully perverse. Just as the turn of the century
Progressives reconstructed childhood and adolescence,111 so too Americans in
the last half of the twentieth century have limned a new refiguration of the
human life cycle in which childhood and adolescence have been re-imagined. As
a result, the Progressives' view of childhood now seems so foreign to our current
assumptions that it may be difficult for us to credit that they seriously believed in
it.
When adolescence was conceived at the turn of the century, it was assimi-
lated into the familiar category of childhood. Children and adolescents were
seen as sub-categories of one larger category, whose members were considered
more like infants in their nature and needs than they were like adults.' 12 The
dichotomy between the essential natures of the child and adult remained intact.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the human life cycle
increasingly was sub-divided into more and more stages of life.' 13 Beyond ado-
room. The judge was not to be seated above the courtroom on a bench, but was to be "[s]eated at a
desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw
the lad to him ...." Mack, supra note 93, at 120.
108. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 54, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905). See generally D. RoTm-
MAN, supra note 68, at 216-17 (adjudication of guilt secondary to assessing social needs of the ac-
cused juvenile).
109. Mack, supra note 93, at 117.
110. 1 have culled those appellations from Judge Mack's law review article, supra note 93, at
117, 119, 120, in which he repeatedly uses them. Such usage is not peculiar to him, as can be seen
elsewhere in this Article in the quotes from other juvenile justice advocates, as well as in the lan-
guage chosen by states in statutorily framing their juvenile court system. See, eg., statutes cited in
supra note 100.
I 1l. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
112. Skolnick, supra note 52, at 74.
113. See H. CHUDACOFF, supra note 72, at 157-90; J. DEMOS, supra note 74, at 114-31; L.
FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHoRrrY, AND CULTURE 169-75 (1990).
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lescence, but before full adulthood, "youth" was defined as a new life stage en-
compassing those from their late teens into their twenties and even early thirties,
roughly corresponding to the years spent in college and graduate education.
114
Even adulthood was fragmented into life stages with attributed characteristics-
old age was divided into the vigorous "young-old" and the truly "old-old,"
115
and the prime of life was sub-divided into salient stages as well. 116 Nor was this
reconstruction of the life-cycle a preoccupation limited to academics; the mass
media contributed "yuppies," "mid-life crisis," and the "menopausal male" to
our vocabulary and to our vision of ourselves. By the latter part of the twentieth
century, everyone was "just going through a phase."
As the life-cycle became fragmented into more stages, it became harder to
see each stage as absolute and dichotomous.1 7 Age segregation, which followed
from viewing life stages as discrete periods with characteristic attributes and
needs, makes less sense when the life cycle is seen more as a continuum 18 than
as a sharply divided passage between childhood and adulthood. Boundaries de-
lineating age-appropriate behavior have blurred, especially among the young,
with both younger children 1 9 and young adults adopting styles, attitudes, and
activities that society formerly considered characteristic of adolescence. 120
Although at the turn of the last century, G. Stanley Hall confidently could delin-
eate the quintessential and definitive characteristics of adolescence, researchers
in the closing -decades of this century saw a multiplicity of adolescences.
12 1
From this later vantage point, adolescence did not seem to have any intrinsic
and invariant characteristics. 122
114. Keniston, Youth.4 "New"Stage of Life, 39 AM. SCHOLAR 631, 635 (1970); K. KENISTON,
YOUTH AND DISSENT 7 (1971) (youth seen as a time of flexible experimentation in lifestyle, laying
foundations for later stability in occupation, marital status and self-identity).
115. Neugarten, 4ge Groups in American Society and the Rise of the Young-Old, 415 ANNALS OF
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 187 (1974) (distinguishing between those in their sixties and seventies,
as the young-old, and those over eighty, as the old-old).
116. Dannefer, 4dult Development and Social Theory, 49 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 100, 101-04
(1984); Levinson, A Conception of Adult Development, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 3, 5-6 (1980); D.
LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE 18-33 (1978) (subdividing middle age).
117. As a general proposition, the greater the number of categories into which a field is divided,
the less "fundamental" the categories seem. This may be because human beings are cognitively
predisposed to organize information into simpler systems of meaning or because there really is a
relationship between truth and elegance of explanation. Consider, however, the discomfiture of con-
temporary particle physics, with its multiplicity of "elementary" particles and its longing for a grand
unified theory to impose elegant order on what are now seen as the four basic physical forces. See,
e.g., S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 63-79, 155-69 (1988).
118. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 100 (1982)
("growing up is a process," not an event).
119. Some commentators have noted that childhood today appears attenuated in comparison
with the childhood of our recent past, with children adopting adult values, attitudes and interests at
earlier ages. See, e.g., N. POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 120-34 (1982); M.
WINN, CHILDREN WrrHOUT CHILDHOOD 3-7 (1983); Empey, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 27 (L. Empey ed. 1979).
120. Skolnick, supra note 66, at 164-65.
121. Id. at 160; J. DEMOS, supra note 74, at 107-13 (citing research in psychology and sociology
suggesting that in the 1970s and 1980s, adolescence was no longer a salient life stage, at least among
working-class youths).
122. Whereas it would have been unthinkable for 1950s teachers to have "rocked around the
clock," and whereas many considered a miniskirt-clad thirty-year-old a pathetic figure of fun in the
1960s, by the 1990s the person in a neon jogging suit swaying to the beat of the latest pop tune could
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Nor did the young appear to be as inherently and essentially different from
adults as formerly had been assumed. Psychological research123 showed that
even comparatively young children possessed cognitive and reasoning abilities
equivalent to those of adults. 124 The newer research showed that children were
neither as incompetent as, nor adults as competent as, earlier psychologists had
believed. 125 In the words of one sociologist, "In the post-industrial era... the
institutional and psychological basis for conceiving childhood and adulthood as
distinct stages of life may no longer exist."
126
Today we are witnessing the breakdown of the binary opposition 27 be-
tween child and adult, which provided the conceptual foundation of juvenile
court jurisprudence. Conservatives 12 8 and liberals 129 may disagree on the poll-
plausibly be any age from six to sixty. Blue jeans, once the identifying uniform of the adolescent,
now come in tiny infant sizes with snaps to allow easy diapering, and in sizes explicitly marketed for
the older customer, cut to accommodate middle-aged spread. We seem to have come full circle, with
young and old sharing styles of dress and amusement as they did in medieval days. See supra notes
58-65 and accompanying text.
123. The new psychological findings did not create the new construction of childhood. Rather,
the changing social construction of childhood made the cognitive capacities of children an interest-
ing area for research and made plausible the results that children and adults did not greatly differ in
their cognitive attributes. For a discussion of the sociology of scientific research and Kuhnian para-
digms, see supra note 25; see also N. SHOVER, A SOCIOLOGY OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 75-76
(1979) (research breakthroughs follow changes in social context, not vice versa). The resulting psy-
chological literature lent support to the underlying cultural assumptions that children and adults
were not dissimilar in their capacities and, in that way, reinforced the new construction of
childhood.
124. For a survey of the psychological literature suggesting that children as young as 10 years
old are as competent at decision-making as adults, see L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE:
A NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS 61-73 (1980); Melton, Developmental Psychology and
the Law: The State oftheArt, 22 J. FAM. L. 445, 463-64 (1984); Melton, Taking Gault Seriously:
Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 153-58 (1989). Lawrence Kohlberg conducted
the foundational study of moral reasoning in children. See Kohlberg, The Development of Children's
Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6 VITA HUMANA 11, 16 (1963) (observing that by age 14, the
average child has reached the equivalent level of moral reasoning possessed by most adults); see also
Skolnick, supra note 66, at 144-48 (providing later research on moral reasoning); Skolnick, supra
note 52, at 52-55 (same).
125. Skolnick, supra note 52, at 56.
126. Id. at 74.
127. As a more general observation, binary oppositions thoroughly riddle-legal discourse. Ex-
amples include public versus private, subjective versus objective, fact versus value, substance versus
procedure, rule versus standard, and so on, almost ad infinitum. Describing, decrying, and decon-
structing these oppositions has given rise to an academic cottage industry. Out of the enormous
body of scholarship which it has generated, I would, however, single out Pierre Schlag's playful yet
deadly serious analysis of binary oppositions or "splits" in the law. See Schiag, Cannibal Moves An
Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REv. 929, 930, 962-63 (1988); see
also id. at 937-44 (discussing split proliferation and infinite regress). Professor Schlag's demonstra-
tion that the reflexive character of legal discourse leads splits to "cannibalize" the legal order sug-
gests an intriguing comparison to the consequences of the breakdown of the adult-child dichotomy
through split proliferation as well.
128. For example, a Reagan administration official rejected the idea that teenaged delinquents
ought to be treated differently from adult offenders, saying, "Trhere is no reason why society should
be more lenient with a 16-year-old first offender than a 30-year-old first offender." Regnery, supra
note 4, at 68; see also E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND
PAINFUL QUESTION 173-75 (1975) ("There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible
under the same laws that apply to adults. The victim of a 15-year-old mugger is as much mugged as
the victim of a 20-year-old mugger ... ."). Of course, while van den Haag's focus on the harm
suffered by the victim is an appealing rhetorical device, it proves too much if it is read to eliminate
the concept of mens rea from criminal law. The victim of an accidental contact may be just as
injured as the victim of an intentional blow, but surely van den Haag would balk at imposing the
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cies that ought to be implemented to deal with youthful criminal offenders, but
both ends of the political spectrum agree that the child-adult distinction is a
false dichotomy1 30 that can no longer support disparate justice systems.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RE-IMAGINATION OF CHILDHOOD
As the socially constituted perception of adolescence and childhood has
evolved during the late twentieth century, the premises of the parens patriae
juvenile court no longer correspond to our cultural image of the young. Just as
the invention of adolescence at the turn of the century made the Progressives'
child welfare law reforms both possible and necessary, so, too, the contemporary
change in the images of adolescence and childhood has legal implications that
both reflect the change and at the same time reinforce it.
A. The 'Just Desserts' Juvenile Court
1. Rejection of Parens Patriae Ideology
The history of correctional philosophy in the second half of the twentieth
century is a tale of steadily increasing loss of faith in positivistic penology.
13 1
The original architects of the juvenile court were confident that juvenile delin-
quents could be rehabilitated, as long as judges possessed the expertise, informa-
tion, and resources necessary for proper diagnosis and treatment. Despite
several decades of experience with rehabilitative penology in the adult and juve-
nile justice systems, however, criminal recidivism stubbornly refused to wither
away. Dozens of studies were undertaken to find out what program, what meth-
odology, what theory might work. The depressing conclusion, by and large, was
that nothing worked.
132
same criminal law sanctions in both cases. Notwithstanding this caveat, however, the point remains
that many on the political right no longer view an offender's age as justifying what they see as the
excessively lenient sanctions of juvenile court.
129. Liberal critics have focused on what they see as the illegitimacy of depriving juveniles of
rights that all persons ought to enjoy by virtue of their humanity. "The... belief in the dignity of
man does not have a cut-off point based on age.... To fail to treat a minor as a person... before the
law, is to deny his humanity." H. FOSTER, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 10 (1974). For the
views of other proponents of full rights for juveniles, see H. COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTs FOR CHILDREN
(1980); R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974); and J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974); see also
L. HOULGATE, supra note 124, at 6-8, 95-116 (applying a Hohfeldian analysis to generate a theory of
autonomy rights for juveniles).
130. Dichotomies are proper categorizations when a field can be divided in two with member-
ship in each sub-field being mutually exclusive, with no member left out of a sub-field and no overlap
between categories. When the two sub-categories are either not mutually exclusive or not exhaus-
tive, the dichotomy is a false one. D. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES 9-12 (1970).
131. By positivism in penology, I mean the assumption that external, deterministic factors such
as heredity, environment, or social conditions cause criminal behavior, not an evil exercise of free
will on the part of the criminal, and that unraveling the causes of crime will tell us what sentencing
policies to adopt. S. COHEN, AGAINST CRIMINOLOGY 4-7 (1988). See generally N. SHOVER, supra
note 123, at 35-75, 298-312 (discussing the development of positivistic correctional philosophy and
the growing disillusionment of some experts in the field because of a lack of progress in discovering
either the causes of criminal behavior or its cure).
132. Among the many studies finding that rehabilitative treatment was ineffective in preventing
recidivism are D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT (1975); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
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As a consequence of the general disillusionment with rehabilitative penol-
ogy, the focus of the criminal justice system turned from assessing the social
needs of the offender to assessing the social harm that the offender caused-in
short, from rehabilitation to retribution. 133 This trend occurred in juvenile jus-
tice systems as well, 134 underscoring the magnitude of change in -the social per-
ception of the culpability of young offenders. From a world in which the child
by definition was morally incapable of committing a crime, we have now passed
to a world in which juveniles are to be held strictly accountable for their crimes.
As a result of this shift in juvenile justice philosophy, state juvenile court hear-
ings have come to resemble adult criminal trials. 135
Consonant with this new philosophy, sentences in the new punitive juvenile
court 136 are designed to hold the youth accountable for the offense committed;
any rehabilitative services or programs provided during incarceration are inci-
dental to the punishment meted out. The "just desserts" sentencing model bases
the length of incarceration on how much punishment the offense merits, not on
how long it might take to reform the offender. In rejecting rehabilitation as the
justification for incarcerating the offender, determinate sentencing strikes at the
very heart of theparenspatriae dispositional framework.137 The proliferation of
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PECrs (1979); Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 153 (1966); Martinson, What Works?- Questions and Answers about Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs
17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67 (1971). See generally N. SHOVER, supra note 123, at 274-312 (reviewing
the research on correctional effectiveness).
133. The impact of this change on the criminal justice system can only be alluded to here. Two
schools of thought emerge among the influential voices on correctional reform. On the one hand,
commentators have argued that because rehabilitative treatment is ineffective and unfairly creates
great disparity in sentences, sentencing discretion should be limited, with sentences based on the
objective seriousness of the offense and the record of the offender. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SER-
VICE COMMITrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
145-53 (1971); D. FOGEL, ".... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF... : THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR
CORRECTIONS (1975); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972); N.
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); A. VON IRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
OF PUNISHMENT (1976). In contrast, other commentators have contended that direct crime preven-
tion best assures community protection and, therefore, that sentences should stress deterrence and
incapacitation rather than rehabilitation. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 128, at 248-50; J.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 162-82 (1975); Boland & Wilson, Age, Crime and Punishment,
51 PUB. INTEREST 22, 22 (1978). Ironically, both schools of thought arrive at the same recommen-
dation-determinate sentences proportionate to the offense-via very different political routes.
134. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
135. Supreme Court decisions imposing due process limitations on juvenile court practices have
prompted some of the procedural changes in juvenile hearings. See infra notes 179-207 and accom-
panying text. As the details of the Washington model for juvenile court demonstrate, however, the
new-style juvenile court proceeding incorporates many procedural formalities that were not constitu-
tionally mandated. See infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the sweeping changes in juvenile court philosophy and practice during
the 1970s and 1980s, see Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821, 822-96 (1988); Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice: Some Observations On A Recent Trend, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 131-47
(1987); Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky, & Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME
& DELINQ. 5, 12-28 (1986); Walkover, supra note 41, at 523-24.
137. The court, in In re Felder, recognized the centrality of indeterminate sentencing to the
parenspatriae juvenile court. In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 377, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 533 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1978). The court observed that "[tihe distinction between indeterminate and determinate sen-
tencing is not semantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies. Indeterminate sentenc-
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"just desserts" juvenile sentencing laws in the 1980s138 represents telling evi-
dence of the demise of the older juvenile court model.
2. A Model of the New Juvenile Court
In 1977, Washington state enacted a complete overhaul of its juvenile court
system. 139 Washington's Juvenile Justice Act has been called "the most sub-
stantial reform of a state juvenile code that has occurred anywhere in the United
States.''14 Often cited as the paradigmatic embodiment of the new juvenile
court philosophy, the Washington system is widely acknowledged as the model
for reforms in juvenile court systems throughout the country.
141
Washington's Juvenile Justice Act exemplifies a rejection of both the philos-
ophy and practice of the traditional parens patriae juvenile court. 142 According
to Representative Mary Kay Becker, the principal sponsor of the bill in the state
legislature, the new "just desserts" system enacted by the Juvenile Justice Act
represents a move "away from the patens patriae doctrine of benevolent coer-
cion, and closer to a more classical emphasis on justice .... The presumptive
sentencing scheme . ..makes [it] clear that youngsters who are being sen-
ing is based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate sentencing is based upon a desire for
retribution." Id. Thus, the Felder court held that juveniles subject to a determinate sentence were
entitled to trial by jury, whereas those facing an indeterminate sentence had no such right. Id. at
377-78, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
138. Some "just desserts" statutes provide determinate sentencing matrices, some require
mandatory minimum sentences for many offenses, and some rely on administratively promulgated
sentencing guidelines. See, eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-241 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45436
(Supp. 1975); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731 (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113, 19-3-
113.1, 19-3-113.2 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-140 (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 10,
§ 937 (Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-33, 15-11-37 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, paras.
805-35 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.194, 208.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.015, 260.195 (West 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-
43, 2A:4A-44 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 352.2, 353.5 (McKinney Supp.
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-649, 7A-652 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.353, 2151.355
(Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-131, 37-1-137 (Supp. 1990); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 54.04, 53.045 (Vernon Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.160 (Supp.
1991). Even in jurisdictions without statutory "just desserts" sentencing, judges appear to be exer-
cising their sentencing discretion by basing juvenile dispositions on "just desserts" principles. Feld,
supra note 136, at 882-91.
139. Basic Juvenile Court Act, ch. 291, §§ 1-83, 1977 Wash. Laws 1002.
140. Schneider & Schram, Responses of Professionals to the Washington (State) Law, in CUR-
RENT IssuES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 101, 101 (R. Corrado, M. LeBlanc & J. Trepanier eds. 1983).
141. See, eg., E. MCGARRELL, JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL REFORM 13 (1988); Castellano, The
Justice Model in the Juvenile Justice System: Washington State's Experience, 8 LAW & POL'Y 479,
481 (1986); Feld, supra note 136, at 852-53, 890; Patrick & Jensen, Changes in Rights and Procedures
in Juvenile Offense Proceedings, 14 GONZ. L. REv. 313, 313 (1979); Schneider & Schram, supra note
140, at 101; Serrill, Washington's New Juvenile Code, 6 CORRECTIONS MAG. 36, 37 (1980);
Trepanier, Trends in Juvenile Justice" Washington State, in CURRENT ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
92 (R. Corrado, M. LeBlanc, & J. Trepanier eds. 1983); Walkover, supra note 41, at 508.
142. See Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ. L. REV.
289, 305-07 (1979) (describing the motivation of the state legislature in enacting the new system).
Becker traced the history of Washington's adoption ofparens patriae juvenile justice and the gradual
public dissatisfaction with a system in which courts based dispositions upon treatment needs rather
than proportionate relation to the offenses committed. Id. at 293-95. Becker notes that, during the
debates on the act, the legislature heard testimony detailing case histories of juveniles whose
sentences, based on treatment need, seemed either too low, as in the case of a juvenile given 100
hours of community service and a $50 fine for murder, or too high, as in the case of first time
property misdemeanants sentenced to incarceration. Id. at 294-95.
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tenced-ie., deprived of liberty-are being punished rather than 'treated."' 14 3
The core provisions of Washington's new system are its determinate sen-
tencing scheme, which sets the length of sentence on the basis of two objective
characteristics: the offense, legislatively ranked by level of seriouness, and the
prior criminal record of the offender. 144 Judges may deviate from the standard
sentences only if mitigating or aggravating factors pertain to the offense; more-
over, judges may not base sentencing deviations on their perception of the of-
fender. The law expressly forbids sentencing judges from taking into account
information showing that the offender has been abused or neglected. 14 5 Nor
may prosecutors exercise discretion on the basis of such factors. Instead, they
must prosecute serious cases regardless of any perceived treatment needs of the
child. 146 Even the prosecutorial decision to divert minor offenses from the for-
mal adjudication process cannot be made with reference to social needs of the
child in question.1 47 In short, the new juvenile justice system has divorced con-
sideration of the social needs of the offender from the issue of imposition or
duration of confinement.
The punitive focus of the Juvenile Justice Act was sharpened by Washing-
ton's establishment in 1984 of the Juvenile Disposition Standards Commission
to implement the 'clear policy' on sentencing called for by the Act. 148 Charged
with the responsibility of developing a policy and standards on juvenile sentenc-
ing, the Commission produced the Washington State Juvenile Disposition Stan-
dards Philosophy and Guide in order to "provide direction for the various
professionals in the juvenile justice community and help the public understand
the reasons and methods behind the juvenile disposition standards." 149 The
143. Id. at 307-08. Becker's legislative history is consistent with the statutory statement of pur-
pose enunciated as a preface to the Act. According to the Act, the purpose of the juvenile justice
system is to:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b) Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have committed offenses as defined
by this chapter,
(c) Make the juvenile accountable for his or her criminal behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the
juvenile offender;
(e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged to have committed an offense;
(f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision and custody for juvenile offenders;
(g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities whenever consistent
with public safety;
(h) Provide for restitution to victims of crime;
(i) Develop effective standards and goals for the operation, funding, and evaluation of all
components of the juvenile justice system and related services at the state and local levels;
and
() Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders shall receive punish-
ment, treatment, or both, and to determine the jurisdiction limitations of the courts, insti-
tutions, and community services.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.050(2) (1977).
144. Id. § 13.40.150(3)(h)-(i).
145. Id. § 13.40.150(4)(e).
146. Id. § 13.40.070(3).
147. Id. § 13.40.070(7).
148. Id. §§ 13.40.010(2)(j); 13.40.0270).
149. WASHINGTON STATE JUVENILE DISPOSITION STANDARDS COMMISSION, WASHINGTON
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Commission Guide adopted a youth justice model with three major components:
justice and accountability; community safety; and youth development. 150 The
Commission Guide emphasized that proportional punishment of offenders both
furthers justice 51 and promotes community safety. 152 While acknowledging
that providing treatment services during incarceration might be desirable, the
Commission Guide cautioned that social services must be only incidental to
sanctions, and never the actual rationale for the sentence.
153
Disposition is not the only aspect of juvenile court to undergo a transforma-
tion. Washington replaced the intimate, informal proceeding in which the judge
might "put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him" 1 54 with proce-
dures that, with one exception, 155 precisely mirror those of the adult criminal
trial. The juvenile, like an adult, is charged by prosecutorial information, and
must enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. 156 The arraignment hearing is explic-
itly governed by the same court rules pertaining to adult defendants.15 7 Like an
adult accused, the juvenile has the right to be represented by counsel1 58 and to
the services of investigators and expert witnesses necessary to a defense. 159 The
juvenile is entitled to the same notice of charges, discovery of prosecution evi-
dence, opportunity to be heard, and confrontation of adverse witnesses as an
adult enjoys. 160 Severance and joinder likewise are governed by the same rules
that apply in adult criminal cases. 16 1 Admissibility of evidence is governed by
the same constitutional standards, 162 and the normal rules of evidence apply
STATE JUVENILE DISPOSITION STANDARDS PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDE 3 (1984) [hereinafter COM-
MISSION GUIDE].
150. Id. at 9.
151. "[Ihe community should obtain justice by the fair and prompt imposition of sanctions
upon youthful offenders.... The more serious the youth's offense, the greater the sanction the youth
should receive." Id.
152. "The safety of the community is addressed when sentences and sanctions are based upon
the youth's offense history." Id. at 12.
153. The Commission Guide stated that:
Punishment, under the guise of rehabilitation, is unjust and will be perceived as such by the
youth. A sentence that is geared to the treatment needs of the youth undercuts the signifi-
cance of the crime committed. The need for treatment services should not influence the
severity of the youth's sentence or sanctions.
Id. at 15.
154. Mack, supra note 93, at 120.
155. The exception is that jury trials are not available to Washington's juveniles. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 13.04.021 (Supp. 1991); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 16-17, 743 P.2d 240, 247
(1987).
156. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.130(1) (Supp. 1991).
157. WASH. JUv. CT. R. 7.6; WASH. CRIM. CT. R. 4.1, 4.2.
158. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(2) (Supp. 1991).
159. Id. § 13.40.140(3); WASH. JUV. CT. R. 9.3; WASH. CRIM. Cr. R. 3.1(f).
160. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(7) (Supp. 1991).
161. WASH. JUv. Cr. R. 7.9, 7.10; WASH. CRIM. Cr. R. 4.3, 4.4.
162. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(8) (Supp. 1991). The statute provides:
A juvenile shall be accorded the same privilege against self-incrimination as an adult. An
extrajudicial statement which would be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal proceed-
ig may not be received in evidence at an adjudicatory hearing over objection. Evidence
illegally seized or obtained may not be received in evidence over objection at an adjudica-
tory hearing to prove the allegations against the juvenile if the evidence would be inadmissi-
ble in an adult criminalproceeding. An extrajudicial admission or confession made by the
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with full rigor.163 In essence, except for the lack of trial by jury, the juvenile
court fact finding in Washington is, by statute and court-rule, procedurally iden-
tical to that in an adult criminal trial.
As the Washington juvenile justice model shows, the juvenile court of the
late twentieth century bears little procedural resemblance to the Progressive vi-
sion of juvenile court. No matter how procedurally congruent the juvenile and
adult court hearings become, however, juvenile court dispositions unavoidably
differ from adult dispositions in one key regard: the potential length of incarcer-
ation is limited by the juvenile court's inevitable loss of jurisdiction over offend-
ers when they reach the age of majority. 64 Because sentences proportionate to
offenses therefore may not be available to the juvenile court judge, the trend
towards a just desserts model of juvenile court has sharpened the perception that
juvenile court sanctions are inappropriate for many youthful offenders.
B. Bypassing Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
When a judge perceives that the maximum length of confinement available
in the juvenile system is too short to be an appropriate sanction in a particular
case, a mechanism 165 long has existed to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile court
to the adult criminal justice system.166 Traditionally, the parens patriae juvenile
court judge could waive juvenile jurisdiction over an offender if the judge deter-
mined that the youth was not amenable to the rehabilitative treatment of the
juvenile correctional system.167 In making the waiver decision, the juvenile
court judge focussed solely on the individual characteristics of the youth. The
juvenile out of court is insufficient to support a finding that the juvenile committed the acts
alleged in the information unless evidence of a corpus delicti is first independently estab-
lished in the same manner as required in an adult criminal proceeding.
Id. A 1981 amendment added the emphasized portions to the provision. Act of Apr. 25, 1981, ch.
299, § 11(8), 1981 Wash. Laws 1337, 1351.
163. WASH. JOY. CT. R. 7.11(b).
164. The age of an offender at which the court loses the power to enforce its sanctions is not
necessarily the same as the age at which the court loses jurisdiction to try an offender. Again, the
Washington model is illustrative. Washington's juvenile court cannot try offenders once they reach
their eighteenth birthday, even if the offender committed the alleged activity while still legally a
juvenile. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.300(1) (Supp. 1991); State v. Calderon, 102 Wash. 2d
348, 351-52, 684 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1984). Nevertheless, provided that the juvenile court has not yet
lost jurisdiction automatically, the court may order continued incarceration in the juvenile system
until the juvenile turns 21. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.300(l)(a) (Supp. 1991). Although
many states have analogous provisions, no state has adopted an extended jurisdiction mechanism to
allow unlimited continuation of juvenile sanctions.
165. The name given to this mechanism differs from state to state. In California, the procedure
is a "fitness hearing," determining whether the accused is fit for juvenile cour- sanctions, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1991); Massachusetts conducts a "transfer hearing."
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). In Washington, the statute awkwardly
refers to a hearing to decide if the juvenile court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction as a "decline
hearing." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.110 (Supp. 1991). The most commonly used term is
"waiver," as the juvenile court "waives" its ordinary jurisdiction over the youth. This Article will
use the waiver nomenclature to refer to the procedures for prosecuting a juvenile as an adult.
166. Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 193, 201 (1981) (maintaining that
the need for longer sentences is the moving force behind waiving juvenile court jurisdiction).
167. See S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM §§ 4.1-.4 (2d ed.
1980).
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criminal act itself was relevant only insofar as the nature of the offense commit-
ted mighi indirectly shed light on the likelihood that the child who had done
such an act could be reformed.1 68
The shift from a rehabilitative to a just desserts sentencing philosophy,
however, has greatly transformed the waiver process. This shift in focus was
presaged in the Supreme Court's 1966 decision Kent v. United States.169 That
decision required an adversary hearing before a juvenile could be transferred to
adult court for federal prosecution, and ordered the judge to articulate the spe-
cific basis for the waiver decision. 170 The Court listed several appropriate fac-
tors that the judge must consider in making the waiver decision, including "[tlhe
seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver[,] ... [w]hether the alleged offense was com-
mitted in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner[,] . .. [and]
whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property."' 171 In ad-
dition, the judge could also take into account the more traditional considera-
tions, such as:
The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by con-
sideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living[,] ... [t]he record and previous history of the
juvenile[,] .. .and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the
juvenile... by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court. 17
2
Despite the Kent Court's recognition that a judge must look at the offense itself
in making the waiver decision, theKent opinion still used the nature and* serious-
ness of the offense as predictors of future dangerousness to be factored into the
determination of whether the offender could successfully be rehabilitated. In the
Court's discussion of the issue, one finds no intimation that a juvenile who com-
mits certain offenses consequently deserves a specific punishment, only that juve-
nile correctional treatment might well be fruitless under those circumstances.
In contrast, under the just desserts model, the discretionary waiver proce-
dures, 173 which once centered on an assessment of whether an offender could be
168. Id.
169. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
170. Id. at 557, 561.
171. Id. at 566-67.
172. Id. at 567.
173. There are two classes of discretionary waiver procedures: judicial waiver and prosecutorial
waiver. Except for New York and Nebraska, all states and the District of Columbia provide for a
judicial determination of whether a court should waive juvenile jurisdiction. See ALA. CODE § 12-
15-34 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-202(C) (1989); AaK.
STAT. ANN § 9-27-318 (1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(b) (Deering 1991); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-104 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-126, 46b-127 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 921, 938 (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307(a) (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (West 1989);
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-39 (1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-22 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806
(1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 805-4 (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-4 (Bums
1990); IOWA CODE § 232.45 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571.1 (West 1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (1989); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-817 (1990); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMp. LAWs § 712A.4 (1990); MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125 (1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (1989); MONT.
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salvaged, now direct the judge to focus on how the community can be made safe.
Although the individualized waiver determinations made by juvenile court
judges invariably are inconsistent due to the varying philosophical bents of the
individual judges and to the subjective nature of weighing the factors in any
particular case, 174 judges nonetheless appear to be responding to the new phi-
losophy by emphasizing the nature of the offense over the characteristics of the
offender even in their discretionary waiver decisions.
17"
On the political front, state legislatures have acted to limit judicial discre-
tion in the waiver decision in two ways. Since 1970, half of the states have
amended their judicial waiver statutes to restrict waiver to certain types of of-
fenses or presumptively to require trial as an adult for specific enumerated of-
fenses. 176 A considerable and growing number of states have gone even further,
passing laws that automatically try juvenile offenders accused of certain crimes,
or with specified prior records, as adults.
17 7
CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. § 62.080 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-
B:24 (1989); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:4A-26 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-29, 32-1-30 (1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.26 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419.533 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355 (Purdon 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (1990); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-430 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-11-4 (1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (1990); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3a-25 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 632, 635 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269 (1990);
WASH. REv. CODE § 13.40.110 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (1990); Wis. STAT. § 48.18 (1987-
88); WYO. STAT. § 14-6-237 (1986).
Several states provide concurrent jurisdiction for some or all offenses in both juvenile and crimi-
nal court, allowing prosecutors to exercise their discretion in filing charging documents in either
court system. See ARK. STAT. ANN § 41-617 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (concurrent jurisdiction over all
criminal violations); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247 (1989) (same); WYO. STAT. § 14-6-203(c) (1986)
(same); cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-104 (Supp. 1990) (concurrent jurisdiction only over specific
listed offenses); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.02 (West 1989) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-5 (1990)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-25(6) (1990) (same).
174. See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense; Legislative Changes in
Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. C~aM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 491-94 (1987).
175. The judicial disquiet over having to make forward-looking predictions of amenability to
treatment and preferences for substituting an apparently objective assessment of the seriousness of
offense also reflect the perception among many correctional professionals that prediction of future
dangerousness is, at best, problematic. See N. MORRIS, supra note 133, at 66-76; Morris & Miller,
Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUSTICE 1 (1985).
176. The specifics of these statutory provisions vary considerably from state to state. For a
detailed discussion of the differing statutory schemes, see Feld, supra note 174, at 504-11.
177. Many states have statutes providing for automatic transfer to the adult criminal justice
system based upon the offense charged. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-617 (1977); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 19-1-104(4)(b) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921
(Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.02, 39.04 (West 1988);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 805-4 (Smith-Hurd 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-1(d) (Burns 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1602(b)(3) (1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5) (West 1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(d) (1989);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1104.2 (West Supp. 1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Prdon Supp. 1990);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-25(6) (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, §§ 632, 635a (1981).
In referring to these laws as automatic waiver statutes, I do not mean to imply that there is no
discretion involved in their operation. In choosing what offense to charge, prosecutors control
whether automatic waiver rules will apply to an accused. That choice obviously entails the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. Once the prosecutor has opted to charge a juvenile with an offense cov-
ered by such a statute, however, there is no judicial discretion to retain jurisdiction.
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Automatic waiver statutes represent a total repudiation of the philosophy of
the parens patriae juvenile court, which stemmed from the belief that juveniles
were so different in nature from adults as to justify a separate justice system for
them.1 78 Whereas the traditional juvenile court saw "child" and "adult" as mu-
tually exclusive and essentially dichotomous age-based categories, waiver of
juveniles into the adult criminal justice system appears rational only when this
categorization has blurred. Discretionary waiver rests on the assumption that,
although most juveniles differ enough from adults so that they ought not be held
accountable for their law violations, some persons who are chronologically
juveniles share enough adult attributes to be treated as adults and punished for
their crimes. In contrast, automatic waiver statutes break down the child-adult
dichotomy completely, assuming that nothing inherent in the nature of children
generally or in the individual juvenile in particular prevents holding the juvenile
offender criminally responsible for breaking the law. Because the nature of the
offense rather than the nature of the offender triggers adult jurisdiction under
automatic waiver statutes, the proliferation of these laws is another indication of
the impact on the law of the refiguration of childhood and adolescence.
C. The Supreme Court and the Juvenile Offender
Examining United States Supreme Court decisions that deal with the juve-
nile justice system serves two valuable functions. First, because Supreme Court
justices are themselves culturally and historically situated actors, tracing the
Court's developing juvenile jurisprudence provides tangible evidence of the gen-
eral social refiguration of childhood. But the Court's opinions are not merely
products of larger social processes; these decisions also actively produce social
reality. Supreme Court pronouncements have direct, real-world conse-
quences, 179 reshaping institutions or permitting institutions to resist change, ac-
cording to the Court's decree. Second, and more broadly, the Supreme Court's
impact on society transcends the direct consequences of its decisions. The lan-
guage used in Supreme Court opinions constitutes a powerful rhetorical re-
source, reconstructing the framework within which public debate is
conducted.18 0 That being the case, Supreme Court opinions can be seen as both
cultural context and content, as artifact and architect of legal reality.
1. The Procedural Challenge to the Parens Patriae Juvenile Court
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court undertook a systematic re-
examination of the procedural manifestations of the parens patriae juvenile
178. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
179. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1601-10 (1986) (observing that legal
decisions have coercive, concrete impact).
180. For example, when the Supreme Court frames the abortion debate as an issue of privacy,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); when it looks at racial segregation as a question of enforced
racial inferiority, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954); when it characterizes af-
firmative action programs as reverse discrimination, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 496 (1989), the Court provides a new vocabulary that reshapes subsequent debate, and that
legal discourse, which is highly critical of the Court, cannot be ignored.
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court. The opening salvo of the juvenile court's "constitutional domestica-
tion"18 1 was fired in the 1967 decision In re Gault.18 2 That case arose when a
neighbor called the police to complain that fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault had
made a lewd telephone call to her.18 3 The police arrested Gault and held him in
custody overnight. The following day, he appeared in court without a lawyer to
answer an allegation specifying only that he was "a delinquent minor... in need
of the protection of this Honorable Court."' 8 4 No witnesses were sworn and no
transcript was made of the proceedings. In fact, the neighbor whose complaint
triggered Gault's arrest did not appear in court at all.185 Instead, the Arizona
juvenile court judge questioned Gault about the telephone call.18 6 As a result of
incriminating admissions that Gault made during this questioning, the judge or-
dered Gault committed to a state juvenile facility until his twenty-first birthday,
unless earlier paroled. 187 Had Gault been an adult, however, the maximum pos-
sible sentence would have been a two month jail sentence and a fifty dollar
fine.'
8 8
In his habeas corpus petition, Gault claimed that the Arizona juvenile court
hearing violated his constitutional rights to notice of the charges, to counsel, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, to a transcript and to appel-
late review, and also that the hearing deprived him of his privilege against self-
incrimination.' 8 9 The United States Supreme Court agreed, finding that much
of the procedural informality of juvenile court failed to provide due process of
law. 190
In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked beyond the articulatedparens
patriae philosophy of the juvenile court and critically examined its implementa-
tion in practice.19 1 Despite "the highest motives and most enlightened im-
pulses" of the founders of the juvenile justice system, the Court concluded that
the reality of juvenile court had failed to live up to its promise.' 92 Informal
procedures and unfettered discretion resulted in arbitrariness, not in the "care-
ful, compassionate [and] individualized treatment" imagined by the proponents
of juvenile court.
193
Although the Gault majority expressed skepticism about much of the as-
serted rationale for a separate juvenile court, the Court still apparently accepted
the belief that children and adults are sufficiently different in nature to justify a
181. Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup. Cr. Rav. 233,
236.
182. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 7-8.
188. Id. at 8-9.
189. Id. at 9-10.
190. Id. at 13-14, 30-31.
191. Id. at 14-22, 28-30.
192. Id. at 17-18.
193. Id. at 18-19.
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separate court system. Although the majority acknowledged the brute reality of
juvenile incarceration despite whatever euphemistic labels its institutions might
bear, 194 the Court nevertheless declined to hold that juvenile delinquency adju-
dications are the equivalent of criminal prosecutions. 195 As a result, the Gault
holding was grounded in the due process clause, rather than the more specific
sixth amendment guarantees.' 96 If the Court was prepared to say that "the con-
dition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court,"19 7 it was not ready to
say that being tried as a boy made no difference to the scope of his constitutional
rights.
The consequences of regulating juvenile court procedure through the due
process clause rather than through the sixth amendment became obvious four
years after Gault in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.198 In McKeiver, the Court held
that juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by jury in delinquency
hearings.19 9 The plurality opinion20° reaffirmed that the juvenile delinquency
adjudication had "not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the
meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment. '20 1 Thus the Court framed the
issue as whether "fundamental fairness" required jury trials under the due pro-
cess clause. 20 2 In answering this question, the Court interpreted "fundamental
fairness"' as mandating only those procedural safeguards that enhanced accurate
fact-finding.20 3
As the McKeiver plurality recognized, jury trial2° 4 is the procedural right
194. Id. at 27.
195. The Court said only that delinquency proceedings are "comparable in seriousness to a fel-
ony prosecution," not that they are equivalent to adult prosecutions. Id. at 36.
196. The sixth amendment explicitly mandates many of the rights that the Court denied Gault.
It applies "[i]n all criminal prosecutions," giving the defendant "the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for. his de-
fence." U.S. CONST. amend. VL
197. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.
198. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
199. Id. at 545.
200. Justice Blackmun authored the plurality opinion, in which Justices Burger, Stewart and
White joined. Justice White wrote a separate concurrence consistent with Blackmun's opinion, and
Justice Harlan concurred specially, stating that if he thought the sixth amendment were binding on
the states, he would have found juveniles entitled to a jury trial under it. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan concurred as to the Pennsylvania cases and dissented as to the North
Carolina cases, asserting that the purposes of jury trial are satisfied as long as the trial is public as in
Pennsylvania. Id. at 553-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Douglas,
with whom Black and Marshall joined dissenting, would have found both states' systems violative of
the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 541.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 543. This analysis departs from the earlier discussion of fundamental fairness in
Gault, in which the Court held that procedural due process vindicates interests in preventing govern-
mental oppression as well as interests in promoting accurate fact-finding. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47
(1967); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-58 (1968) (jury trials provide protection
against biased judges, over-zealous prosecutors, and other forms of government oppression). Gault's
application of the privilege against self-incrimination to juveniles through the due process clause
cannot be squared with McKeiver's equation of due process with accurate fact-finding; the problem
with Gault's interrogation had nothing to do with its factual reliability, but rather with governmen-
tal overreaching.
204. Commentators have suggested that McKeiver reflects the Burger Court's general hostility
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most inimical to the traditional juvenile court model.205 With a trial by jury, the
juvenile delinquency adjudication would so closely resemble a criminal trial as to
make a separate juvenile justice system superfluous. 20 6 If a state chose to main-
tain a separate (if concededly unequal) justice system for the young, the Court
was unwilling to make that choice constitutionally invalid.207
2. The Breakdown of the Child-Adult Dichotomy
in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
As an institution, juvenile court depends for its legitimacy upon the belief
that the young inherently differ from adults in their capacity to make responsible
choices, thus making it wrong to hold them legally accountable for breaking the
law.208 One might expect courts subscribing to this ideology to reason analo-
gously that juveniles lack the inherent capacity to be held legally accountable for
the purported waiver of their constitutional rights. Yet the United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument in Fare v. Michael C,29 holding that no
special bright-line age-based rules are constitutionally required to assess the va-
lidity of a juvenile's waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.
2 10
In Fare v. Michael C, a sixteen-year-old juvenile who had been implicated in
a homicide was in police custody. As is constitutionally required prior to custo-
dial police interrogation, he was read his Miranda rights.2 11 Instead of request-
ing an attorney, Michael C. asked that his probation officer be present during
questioning. After that request was denied, Michael C. agreed to speak with the
toward juries and its disinclination to expand their use. See, eg., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
412-14 (1972) (allowing non-unanimous verdict in criminal prosecution); Walkover, supra note 41,
at 522 n.77 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970)) (allowing six person jury to hear
criminal case). But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (five person jury unconstitu-
tional); see also Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1344-45
(1990) (expanding the seventh amendment jury trial right in civil cases); Lytle v. Household Mfg.,
110 S. Ct. 1331, 1335, 1337 (1990) (same); Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2795-2802
(1989) (same). Although under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist the Court has not shown unre-
strained enthusiasm for jury adjudication, the Court's current stance is better described as ambiva-
lent rather than hostile. In any event, the language of the various opinions in McKeiver evinces a
greater concern over the significance of the juvenile status of the petitioner than over the value of
juries per se.
205. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-50.
206. Id. at 550-51.
207. Justice White's concurring opinion makes explicit what is implicit in the plurality opinion:
juries need not be used as long as a juvenile system is reasonably based upon the parens patriae
model, even if it is imperfectly realized. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551-53 (White, J., concurring). Jus-
tice White set forth the philosophical underpinning of juvenile court and contrasted it with that
underlying the criminal law. Whereas criminal law is based on the assumption that individuals act
from free will and consequently may be held responsible, juvenile court is predicated on the belief
that juveniles do not choose misconduct freely, but act because of environmental pressures beyond
their control. Id. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring). Given a juvenile system with that jurispruden-
tial basis, Justice White found no due process violation in denying jury trials. But, he warned, "[The
states] are also free, if they extend criminal court safeguards to juvenile court adjudication, frankly
to embrace condemnation, punishment, and deterrence as permissible and desirable attributes of the
juvenile justice system." Id. at 553 (White, J., concurring).
208. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
209. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
210. Id. at 725.
211. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 473-74 (1966).
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police, and during that interrogation made statements incriminating him in the
homicide.212 On appeal, Michael C. argued, and the California Supreme Court
agreed, that interrogation of a juvenile must cease whenever the juvenile asks for
"an adult who is obligated to protect his interests. ' 2 13 The California high court
accepted Mchael C.'s contention that being a juvenile in and of itself automati-
cally justifies a different bright-line rule to define when the privilege against self-
incrimination is invoked.
2 14
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California high court, hold-
ing that juveniles are not entitled to a special rule that automatically would con-
stitute an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 15 The Court
further rejected any suggestion that a juvenile's purported waiver of his rights
should be judged by a different standard than an adult's waiver would be.
216
Although the trial judge could consider the age and experience of the suspect in
judging whether a waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,2 17 the Court
concluded that the same "totality of the circumstances" balancing test is appro-
priate in evaluating waiver of Miranda rights, whether by adults or juveniles.
The Court opted for a case-by-case evaluation of juvenile waiver of rights, with
the trial judge free to consider how much weight, if any, to accord to an individ-
ual juvenile's immaturity. The holding in Michael C. represents a repudiation of
the view that adult and child are members of binary, dichotomous categories
whose inherently differing cognitive capacities justify separate waiver rules. 2 18
The issue of whether the law ought to recognize the adult-child dichotomy
also arises with the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles. Whether a bright line should be drawn prohibiting executions of
juveniles below a certain age is a question that divided the Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Oklahoma2 19 and again a year later in Stanford v. Kentucky.
220
212. Fare, 442 U.S. at 710-11.
213. Id. at 729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. The Miranda bright-line rule provides that a suspect's request for an attorney is per se an
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that custodial interrogation must end until
the suspect has the assistance of counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68, 473-74. Michael C. asked the
Court to apply a different bright-line rule for juveniles, urging the Court to find a per se invocation of
the fifth amendment upon a juvenile's request for either an attorney or other person legally obliged
to protect the juveniles interests. Fare, 442 U.S. at 729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724.
216. In adopting for juveniles the same "totality of the circumstances" balancing test used to
determine the validity of an adult's supposed waiver, the Court asserted:
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has
been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no persuasive
reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has
waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so.
Id. at 725.
217. Id.
218. Justice Powell, dissenting in Michael C, preferred this view, citing with approval older
Supreme Court cases that did treat juveniles and adults as dichotomous categories in judging the
adequacy of fifth amendment waiver. Id. at 732-34 (Powell, J. dissenting); see, eg., Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (noting that a juvenile "cannot be compared with an adult in full
possession of his senses"); Haley v. Ohio 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion) (declaring that
juveniles are not to be "judged by the more exacting standards of maturity").
219. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, wrote the Thompson plurality opinion. Id. at 817. Justice O'Connor con-
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Both cases were plurality decisions, with Justice O'Connor providing the swing
vote in each case.221 The Thompson plurality adopted a bright-line rule that the
Constitution forbids executing persons under the age of sixteen at the time of the
commission of their crimes.222 In Stanford, the Thompson dissenters assembled
a plurality of the Court to reject extending the Thompson holding to those under
eighteen.2
23
Writing for the plurality in Thompson, Justice Stevens asserted that a
bright-line rule prohibiting executions of those under sixteen is necessary given
the nature of adolescents.224 Citing psychological evidence, he insisted that
youths are inherently less culpable than adults due to their special impulsiveness
and susceptibility to peer pressure.225 He noted the prevalence in our legal sys-
tem of age-based laws reserving certain rights and duties for those over a certain
age. 226 These laws "reflect... this basic assumption that our society makes
about children as a class; we assume that they do not yet act as adults do." 227
Justice O'Connor, however, expressed reluctance to draw a line on the basis
of the invariant nature of adolescents. In her view, even though some juveniles
under sixteen are sufficiently impulsive and immature to make imposition of the
death penalty unacceptable, not all people under sixteen share those characteris-
tics. 228 She based her concurrence instead on a finding that a national consensus
exists against executing those under sixteen.229
The dissenters in Thompson, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and White, rejected
the proposition that persons under sixteen necessarily exhibit attributes that
make capital punishment disproportionate to their culpability. 230 In the opinion
of the dissenters, many juvenile offenders are "indistinguishable, except for their
age, from their adult criminal counterparts."' 231 Instead of drawing a line below
which no juvenile could be executed, 232 the dissent would have allowed juries to
curred with the plurality, and Justices Scalia, White, and Rehnquist dissented. Justice Kennedy
took no part in the decision of the case. Id.
220. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia authored the opinion, joined by
Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy. Id. at 2972. Justice O'Connor again concurred with the
plurality, while Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented. Id.
221. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
222. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
223. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (Justice O'Connor concurred with Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
White, and Kennedy to form the plurality).
224. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-38.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 823-24, 839-48. Varying bright-line, age-based rules prohibit minors from voting,
serving on juries, marrying without parental consent, purchasing alcohol or cigarettes, driving with-
out parental consent, purchasing pornography, and gambling without parental consent. Id.
227. Id. at 825 n.23.
228. Id. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 849-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1983: Hear-
ings on S .829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1983)).
232. The dissent did intimate that there might be some age under which execution could not be
countenanced, referring back to its earlier historical discussion of BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES,
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make case-by-case decisions.233
The opinions in Stanford v. Kentucky 234 are mirror images of those in
Thompson, with the Thompson plurality, now in dissent, arguing for a bright-
line rule prohibiting execution of those under eighteen, 235 and the former
Thompson dissenters, now writing for the Court, declining to mandate such a
rule.2 3 6 Given Justice O'Connor's continued refusal to draw a line based on the
intrinsic nature of youths237 and the addition of Justice Kennedy to the Court,
who voted with the Stanford plurality, it is now clear that the majority of the
Supreme Court has rejected the notion that chronological age ought to divide
those eligible for the death penalty from those who are not.238 In the context of
capital punishment, just as in the context of juvenile waiver of rights, the current
Supreme Court again has repudiated a bright-line dichotomy between child and
adult.
VI. ABOLISHING THE SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL JUVENILE COURT
Having an autonomous juvenile justice system with its own distinctive pro-
cedures made sense in a world that viewed the categories of "child" and "adult"
as inherently antithetical in their essential attributes. Once the imagined nature
of childhood changed and the child-adult dichotomy blurred, however,239 the
ideological justification for a separate juvenile jurisprudence evaporated. With
its philosophical underpinnings no longer consonant with the current social con-
struction of childhood, the juvenile court now lacks a rationale for its continued
existence other than sheer institutional inertia. All things being equal, inertia
might not be an insupportable basis for maintaining the juvenile court. After all,
dismantling the system would entail at least some political and economic costs.
Indeed, overcoming the vested interests of such an entrenched institution could
take a heroic political effort of will. Yet all things are not equal. Perpetuating
an anachronistic juvenile court exacts its own costs, both ideological and practi-
cal. These costs compel me to conclude that the juvenile court ought to be
abolished.
A. Ideological Costs of an Autonomous Juvenile Court
To the extent that today's juvenile court preserves its legacy of greater pro-
which set seven as the minimum age for capital punishment. Id. at 859, 870-71 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
233. Id. The dissent noted that the jury exercised "particularized judgment" in sentencing
Thompson to death. Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
235. Id. at 2987-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2979-80.
237. In Stanford, Justice O'Connor rested her concurrence on her finding that no national con-
sensus forbids executing those between 16 and 18. Id. at 2980-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. The Thompson holding, which prohibited capital punishment for those under 16, must be
considered tenuous authority in light of the limited basis of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in that
case. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. Presumably if the national mood shifted to
favor execution of those under 16, Justice O'Connor would find their execution constitutional.
239. See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
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cedural informality than the adult criminal court,24° the procedural contrast
between the two systems is the most salient feature of the juvenile justice system.
This contrast may be more of a liability to the juvenile court than traditionally
has been assumed, however. When juvenile court practice diverges from that
observed in other courts, juvenile court seems less like a court at all. As Martha
Minow observed, "[d]ue process notions are familiar to every child in this cul-
ture."24 1 Raised on a steady television diet of fictional courtroom drama242 and
local news coverage of notorious criminal trials, American young people have an
image of what a court proceeding should look like.24 3 The perfunctory bench
trial typical of the juvenile court is not what they imagine a trial to be.
24
The gulf between the archetypical trial and its actualized caricature has
significance for juveniles beyond the obvious conceptual dissonance it engenders.
Like any other litigants, juvenile defendants invest the legal system with legiti-
macy only insofar as they see it to be a just system. That perception of justice is
affected not merely by the litigants' degree of satisfaction with the outcome of
the case, or its distributive justice, but also by their belief in its prescriptive
fairness, or its procedural justice.245
Extensive sociological research 246 has explored the somewhat counter-intu-
240. Certainly one remaining instance of procedural contrast is the consistent lack of trial by
jury in the juvenile court. Most states do not legally entitle juveniles to jury trial. See infra notes
258-61. Even in those jurisdictions that allow juvenile jury trials, they are apparently uncommon.
For supporting empirical data, see infra note 262. There is also considerable evidence that, even
when statutes prescribe identical procedures to those of the adult system, lawyers in juvenile court
frequently fail to observe them. See infra notes 285-302 and accompanying text.
241. Minow, Are Rights Right for Children?, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 203, 212 (1987) (cit-
ing J. KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD (1984); R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF (1982)).
242. One can scarcely doubt that media images of trials and lawyers have a powerful influence
on the way in which the public conceives of its legal system. See Friedman, Law, Lawyers and
Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1598-1606 (1989); Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life:
The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & Soc'y REV. 185, 197-204
(1987). For assessment of the impact of one television program on the popular imagination of the
legal order, see Gillers, Taking L4 Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607 (1989). See also Rosen,
Ethical Soap: LA Law and the Privileging of Character, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1229, 1230-31 (1989)
(interpreting LA. Law's account of legal ethics).
243. W. CAVENAUGH, JUVENILE COURTS, THE CHILD AND THE LAW 2 (1959); Paulsen, supra
note 181, at 242.
244. Paulsen, supra note 181, at 242; Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court, in PURsU-
ING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD, supra note 2, at 200.
245. The term "procedural justice" was used first by Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, and Houlden.
Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974).
246. Whether the adjudicatory forum is civil, criminal, or administrative, the sociological studies
consistently demonstrate the effect of procedural justice perceptions on overall litigant satisfaction
with the process-an effect independent of whether or not the substantive outcome was favorable.
See, eg., E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 61-92 (1988);
J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Casper,
Tyler & Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 483, 483 (1988); O'Barr
& Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 137, 159 (1988);
Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Proce-
dure, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 103, 103 (1988). See also Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 541, 543 (1978) (comparing process for resolving scientific controversies with legal
dispute resolution, and positing a general theory of procedural justice encompassing competing val-
ues of truth and justice.); Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation between Procedural and Distributive
Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979) (a more theoretical analysis of procedural justice).
The results of this research have been remarkably consistent, finding that procedural justice
matters in a variety of contexts, even in cultures generally considered far less procedurally oriented
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itive notion that how one is treated in court may be at least as important as the
ultimate verdict in shaping one's opinion about whether a system is just. Ac-
cording to these studies, the key factors contributing to a sense of procedural
justice are consistency in the process, control of the process by the litigant, re-
spectful treatment of the litigant, and ethicality of the fact-finder.247 Consis-
tency in the process means both that the system always follows prescribed rules
and that everyone is treated equally within the system. Process control is the
litigant's ability to determine which issues will be contested and upon what basis
the contest will proceed. Respectful treatment of the litigant connotes more
than just courteous interchange; it also includes investing the litigant with the
full complement of rights possessed by other actors in the system. Ethicality of
the fact-finder entails a sense that the judge is honest, non-biased, forthright and
non-arbitrary in adjudication.
248
Even in its current "constitutionally domesticated" version, juvenile court
procedural practice cuts against these core notions of procedural justice. Treat-
ing juveniles differently from adults-by denying them jury trials, for example-
violates the consistency norm of equal treatment for all and reminds the young
that they do not have all of the rights assigned to full-fledged members of the
society. Similarly, the paternalistic tendencies that juvenile court engenders in
its functionaries undermines the norm of litigant process control. From judges
to probation officers to defense counsel, juvenile court professionals all too fre-
quently assume that juvenile accuseds are incapable of exercising sound judg-
ment in making the decisions that affect their cases. 24 9 Confidence in the
ethicality of the fact-finder is undercut by the dual roles of the juvenile court
judge as finder of fact and sentencing authority. Particularly for the repeat of-
fender, the judge's knowledge of the accused's background and previous crimi-
nal record creates the unseemly appearance that guilt has been pre-judged. In
the sentencing role, expressions by the judge of paternalistic concern for the
juvenile accused coupled with stern judicial sanctioning likewise is inconsistent
with the normative model of adjudicatorial behavior. 25 0 All of these divergences
from procedural justice norms strongly suggest that, in the eyes of juvenile re-
spondents, 25 1 the legitimacy of juvenile court is suspect.
252
than our own. See E. LIND & T. TYLER, supra, at 135-45 (1988) (citing studies performed on
Americans, Germans, and Hong Kong Chinese).
247. E. LIND & T. TYLER, supra note 246, at 93-127, 131-32.
248. Id. at 93-127.
249. For a fuller discussion of the tension between defense attorneys' perceived roles as advocate
and as guardian for their juvenile clients, see infra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
250. See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 19-21 (citing psychological literature which shows that the mixed
messages of the juvenile system, alternating between offers of help and chastisement, causes adoles-
cents to feel frustration, cynicism and contempt for the system).
251. Although most of the procedural justice research examined the responses of adults, those
studies that looked at children's attitudes toward procedural justice factors have reached the conclu-
sion that even relatively young children exhibit responses resembling those seen in adults. See, e.g.,
Gold, Darly, Hilton & Zanna, Children's Perception of Procedural Justice, 55 CHILD DEv. 1752,
1758 (1984). These researchers found that first- and fifth-grade children considered procedurally
irregular punishment of the guilty to be unfair. The children's responses approximated "a sensible,
mature pattern ofjudgment about procedural justice." Id. See also Fry & Corfield, Children'sJudg-
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As a consequence of this loss of legitimacy of the juvenile court, the process
of legal socialization for a large segment of our youth has broken down. Legal
socialization, or the inculcation of a society's approved norms and values regard-
ing the law, has been described as a primary mechanism of social control.
25 3
The legal system, along with the schools, has been considered the most impor-
tant institution involved in legal socialization.25 4 In a legal culture as deeply
permeated by due process concepts as ours,255 strict observance of procedural
rights in and of itself contributes to an inculcation of the values of the social and
political order.25 6 If juveniles perceive their exposure to the legal system as un-
just, however, the legal socialization process fails. 257 Ironically, conserving the
current legal order may be possible only at the expense of abolishing the present
dual system of adult and juvenile criminal jurisdiction.
B. Practical Consequences of Abolishing the Juvenile Court
1. Jury Trial Availability
The most striking difference between juvenile court adjudications and those
in criminal court is the lack of jury trial for juveniles. In the majority of
states258 and in the federal system,25 9 juveniles are denied jury trial unless they
ments of Authority Figures with Respect to Outcome and Procedural Fairness, 143 J. GENETIC PSY-
CHOLOGY 241, 243, 248 (1983) (fourth- and fifth-grade children exhibited procedural justice
attitudes consistent with those of adults). See generally R. Coles, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF CHiL-
DREN 21-52 (1986) (children develop relatively sophisticated political concepts at an early age).
252. The procedural justice literature tends to support the Supreme Court's assertion in In re
Gault that procedural formality will enhance the legitimacy of the juvenile court adjudicatory pro-
cess. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967). The Court may have underestimated the juvenile court's
inertial capacity to appear to accommodate constitutional procedural mandates without changing its
day-to-day routine. For citation to empirical studies describing institutional resistance to change
ordered by Supreme Court decision, see Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1185, 1322 n.274 (1989).
253. Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 89 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977) (articulation of appropriate legal norms
gives juveniles a model to which they can conform their behavior using the term "legal socialization"
to describe this process).
254. Id. at 104.
255. A recent sociological study that questioned adults on whether the courts ought to accord
children aged five, nine, thirteen and seventeen certain rights and privileges strikingly demonstrated
the primacy of this belief in due process. Although there was substantial disagreement on the pro-
priety of children's rights of expression and behavior, a large majority of the respondents believed
that children of all ages should have full due process rights, including the right to jury trial. Helge-
son, Goodman, Shaver & Lipton, Attitudes Concerning the Rights of Children and Adults, 10 CHIL-
DREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 4 (Winter 1989).
256. See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 22 (1986) (seeing procedural formality as a mechanism for learning "norms
of a liberal order that metes out justice through the interplay of rights and restraints on government
power"). Professor Minow is ambivalent, however, about the desirability of liberal rights rhetoric,
noting that it ignores issues of children's need for relationships of mutual obligation and care. Id. at
14-18.
257. Tapp & Kohlberg, supra note 253, at 104.
258. For case law affirming the denial ofjury trial, see Raines v. State, 294 Ala. 360, 365, 317 So.
2d 559, 562-63 (1975); Elkins v. State, 7 Ark. App. 166, 168, 646 S.W.2d 15, 17 (1983); In re T.M.,
742 P.2d 905, 909-10 (Colo. 1987) (upholding denial of jury trial for certain misdemeanors when no
incarceration imposed); In re J.T., Jr., 290 A.2d 821, 822 (D.C. App. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
986 (1972); In re V.D., 245 So. 2d 273, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cerL denied, 249 So. 2d 688
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are bound over upon a prosecution request to be tried as adults. Three states
give the juvenile judge discretion to allow trial by jury,26° and thirteen states
guarantee juvenile jury trials by case law or statute.26 1 Even in those states
where juveniles may opt for a trial by jury, such trials are apparently extremely
uncommon. 262 The juvenile court ethos exerts powerful institutional and ideo-
logical constraints on the accused's exercise of the right to jury trial.263 The
result, whether by legal code or local custom, is that juveniles seldom see jury
resolution of the charges against them.
26
(1971); Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 142-43, 179 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1971); In re Fucini, 44 111. 2d
305, 308, 255 N.E.2d 380, 382 (1970); Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 380, 254 N.E.2d 319, 328 (1970);
In re Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Iowa 1977); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 461
(Ky. 1968); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 597-98 (La. 1978); State v. L.D., 320 A.2d 885, 888 (Maine
1974); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 531, 255 A.2d 419, 426-27 (1969); In re Welfare of K.A.A., 397
N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987); Hopkins v. Youth
Court of Issaquena County, 227 So. 2d 282, 285 (Miss. 1969); O.H. v. French, 504 S.W.2d 269, 274
(Mo. 1973); In re New Jersey ex rel J.W., 57 N.J. 144, 146, 270 A.2d 273, 274 (1970); In re R.Y., 189
N.W.2d 644, 653 (N.D. 1971); In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 80, 249 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1969); State
v. Turner, 253 Or. 235, 244, 453 P.2d 910, 914 (1969); In re McCloud, 110 R.I. 431, 435, 293 A.2d
512, 515 (1972); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 16, 743 P.2d 240, 250 (1987); see also McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 532 (1971) (holding that trial by jury in adjudicative stage of state
juvenile court delinquency proceeding is not constitutionally required); cf. In re Javier A., 159 Cal.
App. 3d 913, 974-75, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 430 (1984) (appellate court urging California Supreme
Court to grant review and hold that juveniles are entitled to jury trial); De Backer v. Brainard, 183
Neb. 461, 470-71, 161 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1968) (Nebraska Supreme Court voted four to three that a
statute denying juvenile jury trials is unconstitutional, but because of Nebraska rule requiring five-
judge majority to hold a statute unconstitutional, court upheld denial of jury trial).
259. United States v. Salcido-Medina, 483 F.2d 162, 164 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1070 (1973); United States v. Doe, 627 F.2d 181, 183 (9th Cir. 1980).
260. The three states giving the judge authority to allow juvenile jury trials are: Alabama, Ex
parte State ex rel Simpson, 288 Ala. 535, 537, 263 So. 2d 137, 138 (1972); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1656 (1986); Findlay v. State, 235 Kan. 462, 466, 681 P.2d 20, 24 (1984); and South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-31 (1984).
261. States providing juvenile jury trials include: Alaska, RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 32 (Alaska
1971), ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1990); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-2-501 (Supp. 1990);
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Thomas, 359 Mass. 386, 387, 269 N.E. 2d 277, 278 (1971), MASS.
ANN. LAWS. ch. 119, § 55A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17
(1987); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521(7) (1989); New Mexico, Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M.
717, 724, 437 P.2d 716, 723 (1968); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1987);
Tennessee, State v. Johnson, 574 S.W.2d 739, 744 (1978), Arwood v. State, 62 Tenn. App. 453, 457,
463 S.W.2d 943, 945-46 (1970); Texas, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.03(c) (Vernon 1986);
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (1986); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.31(2) (West 1987);
and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1986).
262. Statistics compiled in a 1978 study showed that the percentage of juvenile adjudications
taking advantage of the right to jury trial ranged from a low of.36% in Alaska to a high of 3.2% in
Denver. Note, The Right to a Jury Under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14 GONz. L. REV. 401,
418 n.125 (1979).
263. Despite the procedural due process protections the Supreme Court put in place, the ghost of
parens patriae philosophy still hovers over the juvenile court, undercutting the full exercise of those
constitutional rights. The same constraints militate against defense lawyers providing the degree of
zealous adversary representation expected in adult prosecutions. See infra notes 285-315 and accom-
panying text.
264. Law review commentators are virtually unanimous in condemning the juvenile court for its
failure to provide jury trials. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 136, at 903-07; Gardner, The Right of Juve-
nile Offenders to be Punished: Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REv. 182,
213 (1989); Handler, supra note 250, at 7; Kalven, The Supreme Court - 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 3, 118 (1971) (criticizing McKeiver); Katz, Juveniles Committed to Penal Institutions -Do They
Have a Right to Jury Trial?, 13 J. FAM. L. 675, 711-12 (1974); Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania:
The Last Word in Juvenile Court Adjudication?, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 561, 563-68 (1972); McLaugh-
lin & Whisenard, Jury Trial, Public Trial and Free Press in Juvenile Proceedings, 46 BROOKLYN L.
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Being deprived of a jury trial hurts juveniles in a number of ways. Juries
traditionally have been treasured265 as a protection against biased judges266 and
overzealous prosecutors, 26 7 because the jury has no access to background infor-
mation about the accused which might cause them to prejudge the case. More-
over, because the jury embodies community values, 268 it functions as the
symbolic conscience of the community.
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Further, it is one of the less well-kept secrets of our criminal justice system
that juries acquit more frequently than do judges. In their germinal comparison
of judge and jury fact-finding, Professors Kalven and Zeisel empirically demon-
strated 270 what every trial lawyer knows: a defendant ordinarily stands a far
better chance with a jury trial than with a bench trial.271 A recent California
REv. 1, 2-3 (1979); Note, A Recommendation for Juvenile Jury Trials in Minnesota, 10 WM. MrrcH-
ELL L. REv. 587, 600-18 (1984); Note, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAc. L.J.
811, 815-19 (1977); Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 650, 678-92 (1972); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14
GONz. L. REv. 401, 415-19 (1979). Notwithstanding the barrage of academic criticism and the
transformation of the juvenile court from its parens patriae origins to a just desserts retributive
model, there is no sign that the new juvenile court has any inclination to accommodate jury trials.
See, eg., State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 16-17, 743 P.2d 240, 247 (1987).
265. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court articulated the historical rationale for jury
trials. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). As the Court observed:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestima-
ble safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury
to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to
have it.
Id. at 156.
266. There exists a long-standing fear that judges as a group might partake of some monolithic
bias that would distort their fact-finding ability. See, eg., Norton, What a Jury Is, 16 VA. L. REv.
261, 265 (1930) (noting the 'professional bias' of judges, and championing the jury to counterbalance
the biases of a judiciary "should our bench, either federal or state, ever become 'packed' through the
exertions of any school of thought"). Norton's worry seems uncannily prescient in an age of the
ideological litmus test as a prerequisite to judicial appointment.
267. Juries can temper excessive prosecutorial charges by returning guilty verdicts on lesser in-
cluded offenses of the original charge, for example, by reducing arson to reckless burning, or robbery
to theft. Because a criminal defendant always can ask for a jury trial, prosecutors are encouraged to
make realistic charging assessments to avoid jury trials held solely to whittle down the charge. It
was my experience in several years in a public defender office that when prosecutors charged adults
and juveniles as a result of one criminal episode, not infrequently the prosecutors charged the
juveniles with more serious offenses than the adults. The juveniles could not appeal to a jury to
reduce the charges to ones that more reasonably fit the level of perceived blameworthiness. On the
other hand, the prosecutors knew that a jury would be unlikely to convict the adults of a seemingly
overcharged offense, even if all of the elements of the greater offense technically were present.
268. Justice William 0. Douglas phrased it this way: "A jury reflects the attitudes and morals of
the community from which it is drawn. [I]t... takes the sharp edges off the law and uses conscience
to ameliorate a hardship. Since it is of and from the community, it gives the law an acceptance
which verdicts of judges cannot do." W. DOUGLAS, WE, THE JUDGES 389 (1957); see also Kadish &
Kadish, The Institutionalization of Conflict: Jury Acquittals, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 199 (1971) (ideologi-
cal and institutional role of jury nullification).
269. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
270. Kalven and Zeisel used a database of 3576 cases to study how often the jury's verdict dif-
fered from that which the judge would have pronounced. They found that the jury convicted in
64.2% of the cases, acquitted in 30.3%, and failed to reach a verdict in 5.5% of them. Judges, on
the other hand, convicted 83.3% of the defendants, and acquitted the remaining 16.7%. H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-81 (1966). Adding together the statistics for ac-
quittals and hung juries, juries failed to convict more than twice as often as did judges.
271. Id.
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study comparing juvenile to adult court convictions confirms Kalven and
Zeisel's findings; on comparable offenses it is easier to get a conviction in juvenile
court than in the adult criminal justice system.
272
Why do judges convict more often than juries? One explanation is that the
nature of judicial decision making is intrinsically different from the process of
fact-finding for juries. Judges try hundreds, even thousands of cases every year,
while jurors hear only a few during their service. Over and over again, the juve-
nile court judge hears testimony from the same police and probation officers,
inevitably forming a settled opinion on their credibility. Worse yet, the judge
may well have heard earlier charges against the accused, and thus may come to
hold a fixed view on the juvenile's credibility and character. In any event, the
judge hears pre-trial motions to suppress evidence; even if the motions are
granted, the judge will have heard the damning information.
Another explanation for the discrepancy in conviction rates between judges
and juries is that sitting in high caseload courts such as the typical juvenile
court, judges invariably begin to slip into a routine that may make them less
meticulous in considering the evidence. Judges grow "weary of fact-finding
whereas jurors find it novel and nothing escapes their attention. '273 Not only
may judges consider the facts more casually than would jurors, but they also
may apply less stringent concepts of reasonable doubt and presumption of
innocence.
2 74
Moreover, as a general proposition, fact-finding by a single person necessar-
ily differs from that by a group because the sole fact-finder does not have to
discuss 275 the law and the evidence with others before reaching a verdict. The
back-and-forth, give-and-take of a discussion can cause the fact-finders to recon-
272. P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, YOUTH CRIME AND JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 30-31 (1983) (after controlling for seriousness of offense, juveniles are
convicted of a higher proportion of charged crimes than adults).
273. Norton, supra note 266, at 266.
274. One thoughtful Washington State judge discussed this problem in reluctantly ruling that
juveniles had no right to jury trial:
The longer I have been on the bench, the more value I have placed on the jury. I have
often said, particularly when an adult felon through his counsel or her counsel announces
that they would like to waive a jury, I have-it has become routine for me to tell them that
it's my perception that the longer I am on the bench, at least, the more uncertain I am that
I am truly upholding the concept of presumption of innocence. I cannot be sure that that
is true for anyone else, but I believe that it simply becomes easier for a human being to say
another human being citizen is guilty, if you've seen a jury do it a number of times and if
you have done it yourself. I fear that the standard that I think I hold for myself-it be-
comes eroded. I try to avoid that, but I tell you, I sometimes agonize about it, so I have
come to believe, I've said and I've written about it a couple of times, that the jury is an even
more important institution than I apprehended a few years ago.
Report of Proceedings, Court's Ruling on Respondent's Motion for Jury Trial, State of Washington
v. Loney, King Co. Sup. Ct. No. 85-8-04998-7, at 12-13 (Dec. 13, 1985), aff'd sub nom State v.
Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) (reconsideration denied).
275. Semiotic theory holds that, as a conversation develops, the meaning of the words used by
each speaker undergoes subtle changes as speakers adopt each other's vocabulary and incorporate
these earlier references into their own statements. See R. KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF
SIGNS 59-78 (1988). "In interpersonal dialogue the interaction between speakers is actually an ex-
change between social systems .... In conversation the values of verbal message-signs appear to
shift between systems and also to shift dimensionally as the cumulative meaning of repeated referent
signs becomes more voluminous, that is, denser." Id. at 76.
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sider their opinions in light of the arguments and observations of others. 276 Be-
ing forced to articulate the basis for an opinion forces the fact-finder to spell out
the logical connections between the evidence and conclusions, "giv[ing] contours
to items previously apprehended in a fleeting and unclear manner."
'277
Not only is the judicial decision making process different from that of ju-
ries, but the personal characteristics of judges differ from those of most jurors.
In terms of economic status, social class, race, and gender, it is an understate-
ment to say that judges as a group do not reflect the composition of the commu-
nity at large. 278 That jury pools include men and women, blacks and whites,
279
adds valued dimension to jury fact-finding that judges cannot share.
Additionally, the litigants in a jury trial may probe the jurors for hidden
biases through searching voir dire examination, inquiring about juror attitudes,
beliefs, and experiences that may affect the way in which they would hear the
case.280 In a bench trial, no analogous opportunity exists to explore the judge's
background. Without voir dire scrutiny to detect the possibility of judicial bias,
one must assume that judges are persons of superhuman powers of self-reflec-
tion, able to attend to their conscious and unconscious mental processes and set
aside any biases they might reveal.
The value of the availability of jury trials for juveniles goes beyond curing
the problems of biased judges or disadvantageous fact-finding, however. A jury
trial requires the trial judge to articulate in detail the law to be applied in the
case through the mechanism of jury instructions. Any error of law in the in-
structions is reviewable by an appellate court. If no jury instructions exist to
make explicit the trial judge's understanding of the law, the reviewing court has
no way of knowing whether the juvenile court judge misunderstood or misap-
276. See Norton, supra note 266, at 266 (explaining the value of discussion). Requiring the judge
to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law does not function in the same way as intra-jury
discussion because the judge already has committed herself to a verdict. Articulating the basis for
the verdict is at best an attempt to reconstruct the judge's thought processes in arriving at the verdict
and at worst a post hoc rationalization. It cannot be the fluid exchange of potential positions that
jury deliberations entail.
277. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 11, at 153; see also id. at 152-55.
278. For a survey of current information on judicial demographics, see Slotnick, Review Essay on
Judicial Recruitment and Selection, 13 JUST. SYs. J. 109 (1988).
279. The Supreme Court has reversed criminal convictions in cases in which the jury venire
systematically excluded certain discrete groups. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1940)
(jury venire excluding blacks was not a panel representative of the community); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946) (exclusion of women causes "a flavor, a distinct quality [to be]
lost"). For this reason, courts have constitutionally forbidden prosecutors from exercising peremp-
tory challenges to jurors on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
280. For commentary extolling the importance of voir dire in securing a fair trial, see Babcock,
Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 558-63 (1975); Bush, The Case
for Expansive Voir Dire, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY 9, 15-20 (1978); Karcher, The Importance of Voir
Dire, 15 PRACTICAL LAW. 59, 59-60 (1969). The proliferation of voir dire handbcoks for practition-
ers is a measure of the estimation that voir dire holds in the minds of trial lawyers. See, eg., NA-
TIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (2d. ed. 1984); L. BLUE & J.
SAGINAW, CALLAGHAN'S TRIAL PRACTICE SERIES: JURY SELECTION - STRATEGY AND SCIENCE
(1986); A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL TRIALS (1985); V. STARR & M.
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION, AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY LAW AND METHODS (1985);
Fahringer, In the Valley of the Blind: A Primer of Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 116 (1980).
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plied the law to the juvenile's detriment. As a result, juveniles denied a jury trial
lose out twice. They are more likely to be convicted in the first place,28 1 and are
unlikely to be able to prove an error of law which would allow them to prevail
on appeal.
Denying juveniles jury trials has symbolic costs as well, undermining the
perceived legitimacy 282 of the judicial process in the eyes of the juvenile.
2 83
Given the centrality of the jury trial in the popular cultural vision of the legal
system, it is not surprising young people share the general public's high regard
for the jury trial, ranking it highly among their constitutional rights.284 Thus,
the right to jury trial is important both symbolically and substantively. If abol-
ishing the juvenile court is the only practical means of securing jury trials for
juveniles charged with criminal offenses, then abolition would be well worth it
for that benefit alone.
2. Achieving Effective Assistance of Counsel
In the literature on the contemporary juvenile court, a harsh indictment of
the legal counsel available to juveniles is a repeated refrain. 285 Notwithstanding
that more than twenty years ago the Supreme Court constitutionally guaranteed
legal counsel to juveniles charged with crimes,286 the most recent empirical
studies reveal that a shockingly high proportion of juveniles still are tried with-
281. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (discussing procedural justice).
283. Professor Kalven observed that, "an important function of the jury is its capacity to en-
hance the youthful offender's perception of the juvenile process .... [J]ury trial is essential to the
appearance of fairness, impartiality and orderliness to the juvenile and the general public." Kalven,
The Supreme Court - 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 118 (1971).
284. In a recent sociological study, eighth graders were told to imagine that Americans could
only retain some of their constitutional rights, and then asked to rank which basic rights they most
valued. The right to jury trial was judged more valuable than any other right associated with the
criminal trial process. The right to privacy was rated most highly, chosen by 84.3% of the respon-
dents, followed by freedom of speech (82.4%), the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
(72%), freedom of religion (55%), the right to trial by jury (49%), the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation (38%), the right to counsel (23.5%), freedom of assembly (23.5%), freedom of the press
(22%), and the right to bear arms (16%). Sibley, Child's Play: The Origins of Hegemony, Acquies-
cence and Obligation in Adolescents' Studies of Law 7 (1989) (unpublished paper presented at an-
nual meeting of Law and Society Association at Madison, Wisconsin, 1989).
285. Commentators unanimously have blasted the caliber of advocacy on behalf of juveniles
accused of criminal offenses. For a representative sample of this chorus of protest, see M. BORTNER,
INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 136-39 (1982);
M. FINKELSTEIN, A. WEISS, S. COHEN & S. FISHER, PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE COURT:
GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 40-42, 51-62 (1973) (describing Boston Juvenile Court); B. FLICKER,
PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED JUVENILES 2 (1983); J. KNITZER & M. SOBIE, LAW GUARDI-
ANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 8-9 (1984);
E. LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL CHANGE: REVOLUTION WITHIN THE JUVENILE COURT
178 (1970); A. PLATr, supra note 5, at 163-75; Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime
Control and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & Socy' REV. 263, 297-300 (1980); Davidson
& Saul, Youth Advocacy in the Juvenile Court: A Clash of Paradigms, in LEGAL REFORMs AFFECT-
ING CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES 29, 40-41 (G. Melton ed. 1982); Duffee & Siegel, The Organiza.
tion Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 544, 548-49 (1971); Feld, supra
note 252, at 1207-08; Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the
Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 398-99 (1971); Fox, supra note 85, at 1236-37; Platt &
Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1156, 1168-81 (1968).
286. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
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out lawyers. 2 7 As it turns out, those juveniles may be the lucky ones; over and
over again, studies have shown that juveniles with lawyers fare worse in juvenile
court than those proceeding without counsel, being more likely to be incarcer-
ated and jailed for longer periods than if represented pro se.
288
These statistics reveal only the correlation between legal representation and
more severe dispositions, and not why this disadvantage exists. One possibility
is that lawyers hurt their clients through sheer incompetence and inadequacy in
their advocacy. 28 9 Another is that lawyers in juvenile court may deliberately
solicit harsher penalties, believing that such dispositions are in their clients' best
interests in the long run.2 9 0 Still another explanation is that juvenile court
judges may display conscious or unconscious antagonism toward the idea of at-
torneys in juvenile court, and take out their hostility on the represented cli-
ents.29 1 Or it may be that the juvenile court judge has prejudged the case and
predetermined the likely sentence before the proceedings began, and to save the
system time and money, encourages waiver of counsel in those cases where the
probable sanction is comparatively light. What is clear, however, is that all of
these factors find factual support in current studies of the juvenile court.
As is demonstrated in two in-depth examinations of juvenile court proce-
dures,292 trials in juvenile court293 are frequently "only marginally con-
tested," 294 marked by "lackadaisical defense efforts."' 295  Defense counsel
287. For a survey of statistical studies on the percentage of juvenile offenders represented by
counsel, see Feld, supra note 252, at 1199-1200. Professor Feld's own extensive empirical work on
this question indicates that there are gross fluctuations from state to state, and from county to
county within a state, in the proportion of juveniles who receive legal representation. The situation
in Minnesota is, however, representative; overall, Professor Feld estimates that fewer than half of
Minnesota's accused juvenile offenders have lawyers. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Crss-State
Comparison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 400-02 (1988)
[hereinafter Feld, A Cross-State Comparison].
288. Even when comparing offenders accused of similar crimes, and controlling for prior record,
the sociological research has demonstrated that, all things being equal, lawyers appear to hurt, not
help, their clients appearing in juvenile court. See M. BORTNER, supra note 285, at 139-40; L. STA-
PLETON & V. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 64-65 (1972); Clarke & Koch, supra note 285, at 304-06; Duffee &
Siegel, supra note 285, at 548-53; Feld, A Cross-State Comparison, supra note 287, at 393; Hayeslip,
The Impact of Defense Attorney Presence on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 30 Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 9, 12
(1979). For a detailed regression analysis controlling for disparities in seriousness of offense, prior
criminal history, and detention status, see Feld, supra note 252, at 1239, 1250, 1260, 1306-12.
289. See infra notes 292-302 and accompanying text.
290. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
291. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
292. M. FINKELSTEIN, A. WEISS S. COHEN & S. FISHER, PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE
COURT: GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 51-62 (1973) [hereinafter PROSECUION IN THE JUVENILE
COURT] (a federally funded examination of the Boston Juvenile Court); J. KNrrZER & M. SOME,
LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF CHIL-
DREN (1984) [hereinafter LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE] (a study of New York's juvenile
courts commissioned by the state's bar association). These two studies provide specific localized
confirmation of charges generally leveled at the juvenile justice system. See supra note 285.
293. 1 would caution that the description of juvenile court given here is not invariably and uni-
versally applicable. Many able and aggressive advocates practice in juvenile court; certain public
defender offices pride themselves on their zealous juvenile representation. By the same token, not all
adult defendants receive vigorous and proficient assistance of counsel. Looking at these systems in
the aggregate, however, the discrepancy between the quality of counsel generally available in juvenile
court and that afforded adults has been too often observed to go unremarked.
294. PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE COURT, supra note 292, at 51.
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generally make few objections, 296 and seldom move to exclude evidence on con-
stitutional grounds. 297 Defense witnesses rarely are called, 298 and the cross-ex-
amination of prosecution witnesses is "frequently perfunctory and reveals no
design or rationale on the part of the defense attorney. ' 29 9 Closing arguments
are sketchy when they are made at all. 3°° Watching these trials, one gets the
overall impression that defense counsel prepare minimally or not at all.3 01 The
New York State Bar Association study estimated that in forty-five percent of all
juvenile trials, counsel was "seriously inadequate"; in only five percent could the
performance of defense counsel be considered "effective representation.
°3 0 2
One explanation for the abysmal performance of defense counsel is that
lawyers in juvenile court are all too frequently both inexperienced and over-
worked. Particularly in jurisdictions where juveniles have no right to jury trial,
public defender offices often assign their greenest attorneys to juvenile court to
season them.30 3 Supervision from senior attorneys is not always what might be
desired, 3e4 and caseloads in these high volume30 5 courts are crushing. More-
over, in a forum without jury trials, there is a tendency for lawyers to cut cor-
ners in these cases of comparatively low public visibility, a tendency often tacitly
encouraged by judges anxious to process cases as expeditiously as possible.
Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that juvenile bench trials are seldom
models of zealous defense advocacy.
30 6
In addition, defense lawyers who routinely practice in juvenile court face
tremendous institutional pressures to cooperate in maintaining a smoothly func-
tioning court system.30 7 The defense lawyer who is seen as obstreperous in her
295. Id. at 41.
296. Id. at 52, LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE, supra note 292, at 8.
297. PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE COURT, supra note 292, at 52.
298. Id. at 51.
299. Id.
300. In the Boston Juvenile Court, summations by the defense were "the exception rather than
the rule." Id. at 52.
301. LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE, supra note 292, at 8-9.
302. Id. at 8-9.
303. Feld, supra note 252, at 1331. Barbara Flicker notes, "[I]n some defender offices, assign-
ment to 'kiddie court' is the bottom rung of the ladder, to be passed as quickly as possible on the way
up to more visible and prestigious criminal court assignments." B. FLICKER, supra note 285, at 2;
see also Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 421, 431 (noting low
priority given to juvenile court work by many defenders).
304. Feld, supra note 252, at 1331.
305. Two organizations that have commissioned studies on delivery of legal services to indigent
defendants have recommended maximum caseloads of 200 juvenile cases per attorney per year. NA-
TIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND
AWARDING INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE CONTRACTS, Guideline II1-5 (1983 Draft); NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE ON COURT
STANDARDS 13.12 (1973). Few if any public defenders, however, can limit themselves to the recom-
mended caseload. In a telephone survey of urban public defender offices across the country, I found
no office whose juvenile court caseload met the 200-case guideline. Actual caseload per attorney in
1989 ranged from a low of 250 to a staggering high of 550 cases. The situation may be even more
desperate in rural areas; one rural Washington county assigned 912 juvenile cases to one lawyer. 4
WASH. CRIM. DEF. No. 3 at 8 (August 1990).
306. Fox, supra note 85, at 1236-37.
307. The process of cooptation, or being rendered unthreatening to a system by assimilating
oneself to its values and practices, has long been a problem for defense attorneys in juvenile court.
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advocacy will be reminded subtly, or overtly if necessary, 30 8 that excessive zeal
in representing her juvenile clients is inappropriate and counter-productive. If
she ignores these signals to temper her advocacy, the appointed defense lawyer is
vulnerable to direct attacks, such as having her fees slashed or being excluded
from the panel of lawyers from which the court makes indigent appoint-
ments. 30 9 Seldom are such crude measures necessary, however. For most de-
fense lawyers, withstanding the psychological debilitation attendant upon being
the sustained focus of judicial and prosecutorial disapproval is hopeless.310
Perhaps the most pervasive and insidious reason for less than zealous de-
fense advocacy is the ambiguity felt by many juvenile court lawyers concerning
their proper role.311 The legacy of decades of paternalistic parens patriae ideol-
ogy is still evident in the attitudes of many defense lawyers, who cannot help
thinking of themselves as charged, at least in part, with a responsibility to act in
their clients' long term best interests rather than scrupulously to safeguard their
legal rights.3 12 Despite the clear ethical mandate to represent juveniles on the
same terms and with the same zeal as they would adults,3 13 many defenders
nevertheless find themselves deeply torn between their professional obligation to
press their clients' legitimate legal claims and their paternalistic inclination to
See M. BORTNER, supra note 285, at 136-39; B. FLICKER, supra note 285, at 2A; A. PLATr, supra
note 5, at 163-75; Feld, supra note 252, at 1207-08; see also Clarke & Koch, supra note 285, at 297-
300 (1980) (providing statistical support for ineffectiveness of juvenile counsel). Cooptation of de-
fense counsel is not a phenomenon peculiar to juvenile court; it exists to some degree among defense
lawyers in all criminal justice systems. See generally Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 15, 18-24 (Issue 2 1967)
(institutional pressures encourage defense counsel to place the interests of the court system above the
interests of the client, resulting in counsel adopting a conciliatory rather than adversarial stance in
representing the client).
308. M. BORTNER, supra note 285, at 137.
309. B. FLICKER, supra note 285, at 4.
310. See Feld, supra note 252, at 1207-08.
311. See generally Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, supra note 285, at 398-401 (discussing various
roles counsel assumes when representing juvenile clients and systemic influences on these roles).
312. A survey of defenders in New York State showed that 85% of those lawyers considered
their role to be that of a guardian ad litem. LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE, supra note
292, at 8-9. In a typical example of this attitude, one unnamed public defender described his custom-
ary practice in this way:
Ordinarily I stipulate that the probation officer's report is acceptable in the jurisdictional
hearing. Otherwise he would have to bring in witnesses. In many such cases, perhaps
most, the evidence would not support the judgment, but I hate to see a young kid get the
idea that he can get away with something. One 15 year old boy who broke into a bar and
took a case of beer told me in an interview that his problem was that he got caught. I
became indignant and asked him if he wasn't too young to drink. The boy said, "No, only
too young to buy." I decided he needed to be jolted-maybe with a stay in detention-so I
encouraged him to admit his guilt in court. No corpus delicti needed to be established. If it
had been an adult ease, I would have taken the position that the D.A. could not prove his
case, because the beer was never found and not even reported until a month after it
disappeared.
E. LEMERT, supra note 285, at 178 (quoting an unnamed public defender).
313. The American Bar Association stipulates that the lawyer with a juvenile client must repre-
sent that client's legal interests, and that it is up to the client to decide what those interests are, after
consultation with the lawyer. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR AssOCI-
ATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PAR-
TiEs§ 3.1(a), (b) (1980). The lawyer has the same obligation as to an adult client to keep his juvenile
client informed of the progress of his case, and the same requirement to keep his client's confidences
and secrets inviolate. Id. §§ 3.3, 3.5.
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help the court address their clients' often desperate social needs. 314 Even law-
yers who have not internalized this role conflict may face external pressure from
judges and probation officers to conform to a guardian-like role.
315
In all of these ways, the institution of the autonomous and distinct juvenile
court inherently discourages effective assistance of counsel for juvenile defend-
ants. As long as a separate juvenile court system exists, separate advocacy mod-
els appear to be the inevitable result. Although rooting out paternalistic
attitudes toward children cannot be accomplished by fiat, abolishing the juvenile
court would go a long way toward ensuring that juveniles charged with crimes
get the same caliber of legal counsel, operating under the same standards of
zealous advocacy, as adult defendants receive.
3. Dispositional Needs of Juveniles
One objection to the abolition of the separate juvenile justice system is that
juvenile court sentencing practices shield young people from the draconian
sentences meted out to adult offenders. This objection, however, both overstates
the protections of the juvenile system and underestimates the degree to which
the ordinary criminal justice system could and undoubtedly would adapt to the
extension of their jurisdiction over minors.
First, the recent trend extending the scope of judicial and statutory waiver
procedures3 16 already has deprived many young offenders of supposedly pallia-
tive juvenile court sentences.3 17 Even for those juveniles remaining within the
juvenile court system, however, it may be anachronistic to think of their
sentences as radically less severe than those they might receive as adults. For
example, one study of juvenile sentences indicates that, compared with earlier
314. See M. BORTNER, supra note 285, at 138-39; see also PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE
COURT, supra note 292, at 41 (quoting an unnamed Massachusetts defender, "By the time [the
client] gets to court he doesn't need a lawyer, his problems are so deep. I can help him beat his case,
but if the kid is really in trouble, that doesn't help him.").
315. See Beating the Rap in the Juvenile Court, 31 Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 19 (1980) (decrying
defense counsel who are more intent on winning the client's case than saving the client from a life of
future crime); see also Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a
Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653, 681-82 (1966) ("Above all, the attorney in a delin-
quency hearing should discard any personal interest in winning cases.... [R]eal 'victory' is realized
when a delinquent child has been rehabilitated. The real 'defeat' lies in obstructing the legitimate
operation of the rehabilitation mechanism.").
My own experience as a student attorney in Boston Juvenile Court in the late 1970s is illustra-
tive. In one case, I was representing a teenager accused of possessing drugs that had been seized in
an arguably unlawful search. After I presented my motion to suppress, the judge asked me point-
blank if I really wanted to bring this motion in light of my client's obvious and untreated drug
dependency. He offered to call a recess so I could consult with my supervising attorney, who to his
credit encouraged me to press the issue. In granting the motion and dismissing the case, the judge
commented on what he saw as my misguided zeal in vindicating my client's constitutional rights at
the expense of his true best interests in being forced into a drug treatment program. In his parting
shot to me, the judge predicted that if I continued to practice in Boston Juvenile Court, I would
ultimately wind up agreeing with him. My recurring fear is that he could have been right about that.
316. For a further discussion of this trend, see supra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
317. This includes, most recently, not exempting juveniles over the age of 15 from the death
penalty if they are transferred to adult court. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2980 (1989),
see supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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times, in recent years the juvenile court is incarcerating more offenders 318 and
their sentences are longer,3 19 even though the juvenile arrest rate has been de-
clining since 1975.320 The gap between juvenile and adult sentencing practices
thus appears to be narrowing.
Nor must adult sentences necessarily ignore the fact of youth as a mitigat-
ing sentencing factor. In those jurisdictions that still maintain indeterminate
adult sentences, parole boards and judges alike could consider the age of the
offender in setting the appropriate sentence. For states with determinate sen-
tencing grids, an express mitigation factor for youth could be accommodated
within the ordinary sentencing matrices. There are neither theoretical nor prac-
tical bars to the use of age to mitigate the harshness of average adult
sentences.32 1 Furthermore, available historical evidence suggests that judges
considered youth as a mitigating factor in the past before the advent of the juve-
nile court. 322 Recent sociological data suggests that judges currently give lighter
sentences to younger adults in the criminal justice system.323 There is no reason
to suppose that what has been termed this "punishment gap" 324 between
younger and older offenders will not continue to exist when the juvenile court
has been dismantled.
Nor is there any need for a special adjudicatory system to justify incarcerat-
ing young offenders separately from older criminals,32 5 any more than we must
have a separate women's court or be forced to imprison females in male penal
facilities. Preserving a separate juvenile court system tends to obscure from the
public the extent to which juvenile sentencing already fails to protect juveniles
from exploitation in adult facilities. The grim truth is that, even under a sepa-
rate juvenile justice regime, all too many juveniles currently are incarcerated in
adult penal institutions.
326
318. Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME
AND DELINQ. 5, 22-26 (1986).
319. Id. at 12-16, 22-26.
320. Id. at 11.
321. In the not-so-distant past, the federal criminal justice system maintained an alternative sen-
tencing scheme for young adult offenders in the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005-06, 5010-
26 (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837,
2027 (1984).
322. Historian Anthony Platt suggests that, prior to the juvenile court, young people were not
often charged with crimes. Even when charged, they frequently were acquitted by juries instructed
on the matter of the criminal responsibility of the young, and almost never executed. In tracking
down some of the widely-cited examples of child executions in the nineteenth century, he discovered
a number to be apocryphal, and most of the rest to be cases involving child slaves. He concludes
that the child-saving literature exaggerated the extent to which young people were previously sub-
jected to severe penalties. A. PLArr, supra note 5, at 193-212.
323. Several studies have shown that both juveniles waived into adult court and young adults
normally subject to adult criminal jurisdiction receive lighter sentences than somewhat older adults
with similar offenses and records. Feld, supra note 173, at 500-01; P. GREENWOOD, A.
ABRAHAMSE, & F. ZIMRING, FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OF-
FENDERS 13-14 (1984).
324. Feld, supra note 174, at 501.
325. Historically, many states have set aside certain adult prison facilities for younger adult
offenders. This precedent suggests that states would likely continue as a general policy to house
teenaged offenders apart from older convicts.
326. Most states statutorily require certain juveniles to serve their juvenile sentences in adult
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Worse yet, the current dichotomous juvenile and adult system often forces
the use of adult prisons to incarcerate juveniles waived into the adult system.
While there may be sound reasons for holding certain young teenagers crimi-
nally responsible and trying them as adults, their subsequent incarceration is a
prison administrator's nightmare. In the prison world, these youngest inmates
face a horror of unimaginable violence and victimization. If we abolish the sepa-
rate juvenile court, we detach the question of what place of incarceration would
be appropriate from the question of criminal accountability. Serious young of-
fenders could be given sentences proportionate to the gravity of their crimes
without necessarily requiring that they serve the first part of the sentence along-
side older convicts. In reconstructing childhood as a developmental continuum
in which the development of different capacities may proceed at different rates,
we are comfortable today concluding that a particular fifteen-year-old may have
sufficient cognitive and moral maturity to justify holding him fully responsible
for his criminal conduct, while at the same realizing that he may not be physi-
cally and psychologically competent to hold his own in the world of an adult
prison. Abolishing the juvenile court is thus compatible with our contemporary
sentencing and correctional ideology, and consistent with the current social con-
struction of childhood.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article is a case study applying social constructivist theory in a critical
examination of a legal institution-in this case, juvenile court. This theory as-
serts that the collective social process of constructing systems of shared signifi-
cance makes it possible for the individual to ascribe meaning to the actions both
of the self and others. Therefore, this Article outlines the historical and cultural
construction of childhood and adolescence in our society, and explores the con-
sequences of that interpretive construct for the legal order in its treatment of law
violations by the young. The turn of the century invention of adolescence and
its assimilation to childhood made an autonomous juvenile justice system imagi-
nable and, indeed, indispensable within its social context. Because our interpre-
tive construct of childhood and adolescence has changed, and we no longer view
young people as essentially and uniformly different from adults, we can no
longer justify maintaining a procedurally and practically inferior justice system
for juveniles; hence the call for its abolition.
The reader may question why a normative claim need be made to abolish
the juvenile court, assuming that the current refiguration of the life cycle must
inevitably lead to change in our legal institutions to make the legal order consis-
prisons. To illustrate, the state of Washington permits the administrative transfer of juveniles if they
"present a continuing and serious threat to the safety of others." WAsH. REv. CODE § 13.40.280
(Supp. 1991). Those juveniles who receive adult sentences to be served consecutively to their juve-
nile sentences also may be mandatorily transferred to adult prisons to serve their juvenile terms. Id.
§ 13.40.285. In addition to this kind of statutory transfer, many juveniles are held in adult prisons
and jails without legal authorization. For a discussion of this situation and the litigation it has




tent with our social context. Here I wish to emphasize that the legal order is not
merely a passive reflection of the social context in which it is embedded, but
rather is in addition a dynamic part of that context. As has been noted, juvenile
court would not have been created absent the Progressive Era's attitudes and
beliefs about the nature of young people. But it is equally true that in its ideo-
logical articulation of purpose and in its practice, the Progressive juvenile court
itself helped to change our shared social understanding of what it meant to be a
child.
Social constructivism does not imply a deterministic clockwork universe in
which "superstructural" aspects such as legal institutions respond to overarch-
ing social processes. On the contrary, constructivism insists that it is through
the intentional actions of human actors that society collectively creates and rec-
reates our world. In short, the fact that our social order is culturally and histori-
cally contingent does not make it immune from criticism or proof against
consciously effectuated change. Not only can we examine and understand our
shared interpretive constructs, but also we have the power and indeed the moral
obligation to judge our constructs and to change them if we find them unsatis-
factory. In this study, I have suggested that a separate juvenile court system is
no longer consonant with our current cultural and historical context. I have
further argued that this institution exacts insupportable social costs. As inten-
tional actors in the legal order, we ought to choose to dismantle it.
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